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The Fox in the Henhouse: The Failure of the 
Video Game Industry’s Self-Regulation with 
Regard to Loot Boxes 
Carl C. Jones 
INTRODUCTION 
You are shopping for a loved one. Perhaps the holidays are 
approaching, or a birthday draws near, or perhaps you simply 
wish to show your affection by making a gift out of the blue. Your 
loved one enjoys video games, so you stop by your local big-box 
store and the clerk directs you to a glass-paneled shelf, stacked to 
the ceiling with games in bright neon boxes. You peruse the 
offerings and ask for the clerk to withdraw a few samples. You 
note their titles and prices and consider your loved one’s tastes. A 
clear favorite emerges. Almost as an afterthought, you check the 
game’s rating, noting the stark black-and-white box in the lower 
left-hand corner of the cover: “E10+.” An appended note makes 
the statement a little clearer: “Everyone 10+.” 
You’ve seen these eye-catching labels before; they’re on 
virtually every video game you can think of. Out of curiosity you 
flip the game over, consulting the more detailed rating guide on 
the back side of the box, in the lower right-hand corner. In plain 
black text the rating guide cites “Cartoon Violence” and “Comic 
Mischief” to support the ten-and-up rating. That’s all well and 
good, you think to yourself; comic mischief never seriously hurt 
anyone. Then something else catches your eye, in a narrower box 
beneath the rating guide: “In-Game Purchases.” 
What on earth does that mean? 
You decide you will figure that out later. You purchase the 
game, along with some handsome gift-wrapping. Later, at home, 
you resume your inquiry. The ratings guide says “ESRB,” so you 
run a quick internet search and stumble across the 
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Entertainment Software Ratings Board’s website.1 The 
organization’s “About” page lays out its mission statement 
against an attractive backdrop depicting a city skyline at  
dusk: “We are the non-profit, self-regulatory body for the video 
game industry. Established in 1994, our primary responsibility is 
to help consumers – especially parents – make informed choices 
about the games their families play.”2 Somewhat relieved, you 
consult the ESRB’s webpage detailing the in-game purchases 
label. It explains that “microtransactions” are “[s]maller in-game 
purchases” that “typically augment or personalize the content of 
a game.”3 The webpage further lists “the key types of in-game 
microtransactions,”4 including a term you may not have heard 
before: “loot boxes.”5 
The ESRB defines loot boxes as follows: 
“Loot boxes” or “loot crates” are like locked treasure chests that 
contain an array of virtual items that can be used in the game once 
unlocked. In some games loot boxes can be earned through gameplay 
and/or can be purchased using either real money or in-game currency. 
In most cases, you can’t see the items before you make the purchase.6 
You may not remember loot boxes appearing in the games 
you used to play, and the fact that the contents of a loot box are 
generally unknown before they are purchased may trouble you. If 
so, you’re not alone.7 
Loot boxes and other microtransactions represent an 
opportunity for the video game industry (the “Industry”) to 
monetize particular video game titles for a far longer  
 
 1 ESRB, https://www.esrb.org/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2020) [http://perma.cc/L55P-
RYM5]. 
 2 About ESRB, ESRB, https://www.esrb.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2020) 
[http://perma.cc/PAN2-UT2G]. 
 3 Patricia E. Vance, What Parents Need to Know About Loot Boxes (and Other In-
Game Purchases), ESRB (July 24, 2019), https://www.esrb.org/blog/what-parents-need-to-
know-about-loot-boxes-and-other-in-game-purchases/ [http://perma.cc/5DBB-BBA9]. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See, e.g., Ben Johnson, Loot Boxes Are a Lucrative Game Of Chance, But Are They 
Gambling?, NPR (Oct. 10, 2019, 5:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/10/769044790/loot-
boxes-are-a-lucrative-game-of-chance-but-are-they-gambling [http://perma.cc/S8QS-4WEN]; 
David Zendle & Paul Cairns, Video Game Loot Boxes are Linked to Problem Gambling: 
Results of a Large-Scale Survey, PLOS ONE (Nov. 21, 2018), 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0206767 
[http://perma.cc/333Y-XN33]; Mattha Busby, Loot Boxes Increasingly Common in Video 
Games Despite Addiction Concerns, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2019, 5:51 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2019/nov/22/loot-boxes-increasingly-common-in-video-
games-despite-addiction-concerns [http://perma.cc/LEQ2-9LPW]; How My Son Went from 
Gamer to Compulsive Gambler, BBC (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-
49941610 [http://perma.cc/F2D9-BU2H].  
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post-initial-release period than previously possible.8 Loot boxes 
are particularly lucrative: current estimates project that “total 
spending on loot boxes and skin gambling is forecast to go up to 
$50 billion by 2022.”9 Yet even as loot boxes promise the Industry 
tremendous profit,10 players have pilloried them11 and consumer 
advocates have raised concerns about their alleged predatory 
tactics.12 
This Article seeks to distill the broad cultural and legal 
conversations about loot boxes in the United States into a 
coherent summary. Part I presents the history of loot boxes by 
examining Industry-wide changes in the monetization and 
development of video games over the past several decades. Part 
II addresses the alleged financial and psychological costs that 
loot boxes impose upon consumers by reviewing scientific studies 
and mainstream reporting on the topic. Part III evaluates the 
present controversy over whether loot boxes are a type of 
gambling, analyzing traditional gambling definitions and 
critiquing existing Industry arguments to the contrary. Part IV 
reviews existing self-regulatory measures imposed by the ESRB. 
Part V presents arguments for and against continued Industry 
self-regulation. Part VI explores possible regulatory solutions, 
and the identities of the entities, legislatures, or agencies best 
equipped to implement them. 
This Article argues that loot boxes are legally equivalent to 
gambling. Although others have evaluated whether loot boxes 
run afoul of current gambling laws, and most have determined 
that courts are unlikely to find sufficient value in a loot box 
transaction,13 this Article comes to the opposite conclusion: that 
existing case and statutory law is sufficient for a court to 
 
 8 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INSIDE THE GAME: UNLOCKING THE CONSUMER ISSUES 
SURROUNDING LOOT BOXES, 57–59 (2019) [hereinafter INSIDE THE GAME] (transcript 
downloadable at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/inside-game-unlocking-
consumer-issues-surrounding-loot-boxes) [http://perma.cc/R5CM-3K26]. 
 9 Id. at 58. 
 10 See Loot Boxes & Skins Gambling to Generate a $50 Billion Industry by 2022, 
JUNIPER RSCH. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/loot-
boxes-and-skins-gambling [http://perma.cc/XRT6-HGLZ]. 
 11 See, e.g., Matthew Gault, Gamers Can’t Stop Buying the Loot Boxes They Hate, 
VICE (Oct. 9, 2017, 10:42 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/8x8jq4/gamers-cant-
stop-buying-the-loot-boxes-they-hate [http://perma.cc/JB5U-5JBV]. 
 12 See, e.g., INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 9 (remarks of Andrew Smith, Director 
of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Prot.). 
 13 See, e.g., Alexander Mann, Pseudo-Gambling and Whaling: How Loot Boxes Prey 
on Vulnerable Populations and How to Curtail Future Predatory Behavior, 15 WASH. J.L. 
TECH. & ARTS 200, 225 (2020) (observing that “[T]he prizes for loot boxes do not carry any 
market value.”). But see Edwin Hong, Loot Boxes: Gambling for the Next Generation, 46 
W. ST. U. L. REV. 61, 68 (2019) (“These loot boxes constitute an illegal lottery because in 
each case, there is a prize, distribution by random change, and consideration. Therefore, 
they should be regulated as a form of gambling under California law.”). 
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conclude that loot boxes can have value. This Article engages 
with and critically analyzes the Industry’s arguments against 
such a designation. Additionally, it argues that, even if loot boxes 
do not rise to the level of gambling as it is traditionally 
understood, their economic, social, and mental health costs 
warrant regulation nevertheless as a novel area of law. 
Unlike the present literature, this Article takes a dim view of the 
Industry’s arguments for self-regulation, concluding that external 
regulation is preferable to continued Industry self-regulation under 
the ESRB. It further argues that the Industry’s failure to 
acknowledge the merits of gambling comparisons, coupled with its 
repeated reliance on tired and discredited arguments in the face of 
studies to the contrary, amounts to bad faith conduct. Throughout, 
this Article advances the legal discussion surrounding loot boxes by 
analyzing the transcript of a 2019 Federal Trade Commission 
workshop14 where members of the Industry, academics, and 
consumer advocates made their latest arguments in light of the most 
recent research. Finally, this Article advocates for the use of 
individual limit-setting, in conjunction with transparent pricing and 
odds disclosures, as mechanisms to rein in uninformed and 
compulsive consumer spending on loot boxes. 
I. THE HISTORY OF LOOT BOXES 
Loot boxes are a relatively new innovation in the Industry.15 
Historically, video games were produced in a “developer-centric” 
business model, where individual games were envisioned, 
developed, and ultimately released as standalone titles by their 
developers, who “put it out there and hope[d] [it was] a hit.”16 
From a business standpoint, a game’s success was measured by 
the total number of units sold.17 That emphasis has since shifted 
toward a focus on a game’s “lifetime value.”18 Where games were 
previously static products, unchanging after being shipped19 
(much like a movie), a new “player-centric” era has begun, in 
which the development of “games are being driven by feedback 
from gameplay itself, from attention paid by publishers and 
developers to the chatter around these games online. And then 
they . . . [use] that to iterate on the game after it’s already been 
 
 14 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8. 
 15 See Andrew E. Freedman, What Are Loot Boxes? Gaming’s Big Controversy 
Explained, TOM’S GUIDE (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.tomsguide.com/us/what-are-loot-
boxes-microtransactions,news-26161.html [http://perma.cc/E3C9-25MH]. 
 16 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 57. 
 17 Id. at 58. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See id. 
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shipped.”20 In calculating a game’s lifetime value, stakeholders 
examine “not only how much [consumers] pay to acquire the 
game . . . but [also] how much value is delivered over the life of 
the game through things like microtransactions.”21 Such profit 
windows “are measured in years, not months.”22 
The first commercial home video game system, the Odyssey, 
was marketed by Magnavox and sold in 1972.23 Over the ensuing 
decades, video games have grown into “a $100 billion global 
industry, and nearly two-thirds of American homes have 
household members who play video games regularly.”24 Video 
games are now available across multiple “platforms,” such as 
personal computers (“PCs”), modern video game consoles, and 
mobile phones.25 Through the 1990s and into the dawn of the new 
century, the Industry derived most of its revenue from selling 
individual, self-contained products to consumers, their ultimate 
end-users.26 While these products originally took the form of 
tangible goods, such as cartridges and discs, the advent of the 
Internet allowed for games to be distributed via digital 
downloads.27 Even at that time, the business of buying a video 
game still resembled most consumer transactions for the 
purchase and sale of goods: consumers bought a copy of a video 
game outright (as one might a book or DVD), or in the case of 
some online games, purchased a license to play.28 Video games were 
sold as complete, finished products.29 As the Industry moved further 
into the new decade, “monetisation in video games underwent a 
significant shift,” with a growing emphasis on the sale of 
supplemental digital products to augment the gameplay experience: 
microtransactions.30 While some microtransactions made mere 
cosmetic changes to a game, others granted players “in-game 
advantages.”31 In both instances, these supplemental products were 
available for direct purchase for a set price.32  
 
 20 Id. at 57–58. 
 21 Id. at 58. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Video Game History, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/inventions/history-
of-video-games [http://perma.cc/73P5-PM6G] (last updated June 10, 2019). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 David Zendle et al., The Changing Face of Desktop Video Game Monetization: An 
Exploration of Trends in Loot Boxes, Pay to Win, and Cosmetic Microtransactions in the 
Most-Played Steam Games of 2010-2019, PSYARXIV PREPRINTS 3 (Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://psyarxiv.com/u35kt [http://perma.cc/TGA7-C4SD]. 
 27 See id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See id. 
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By 2006, however, the practice evolved, and some of the earliest loot 
boxes appeared in ZT Online, a Chinese massively-multiplayer 
online game (“MMO”).33 Loot boxes, unlike their direct-purchase 
predecessors, added “an element of randomisation” to the process of 
making a video game microtransaction.34 Now, if a player wished to 
receive a specific virtual item and that item happened to be 
distributed via a loot box system, she could not simply purchase 
that item directly as before; she would have to open one or more loot 
boxes, until she received the item she desired or she gave up her 
search.35  
Today, loot boxes often appear in so-called free-to-play (F2P) 
games, which do not charge an up-front purchase price to begin 
playing.36 Industry advocates have often justified the inclusion of 
loot boxes and other microtransactions in such games by noting 
the high cost of developing a video game,37 as well as the freedom 
these delayed costs afford players to try out these free-to-play 
games before making a financial commitment.38 However, over 
the past decade, and in particular since the release of Activision 
Blizzard’s Overwatch in 2016,39 loot boxes have been increasingly 
adopted as an alternative revenue stream by video game 
developers and publishers, and have been featured in many 
modern-day video games across platforms and genres.40 They 
have appeared in triple-A titles sold in retail and digital stores 
for a sticker price,41 as well as free-to-play games available over 
the internet, whether accessible through personal computers or 
mobile devices.42 At present, loot boxes represent a $30 billion 
industry, an amount projected to rise to $50 billion by 2022.43 
Because loot boxes require players who seek a particular 
digital item to pay money, often without any guarantee of 
receiving the item they desire, critics have likened the process to 
gambling.44 Some countries have since passed laws regulating 
loot boxes by mandating disclosure of the odds of receiving 
 
 33 Steven T. Wright, The Evolution of Loot Boxes, PC GAMER (Dec. 8, 2017), 
https://www.pcgamer.com/the-evolution-of-loot-boxes/ [http://perma.cc/VQ89-ESDF]. 
 34 Zendle, supra note 26, at 3. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See Makena Kelly, How Loot Boxes Hooked Gamers and Left Regulators Spinning, 
VERGE (Feb. 19, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/19/18226852/loot-
boxes-gaming-regulation-gambling-free-to-play [http://perma.cc/9X3H-PDBG]. 
 37 See id. 
 38 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 26 (remarks of Sean Kane). 
 39 Freedman, supra note 15. 
 40 See Kelly, supra note 36. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. 
 43 JUNIPER RSCH., supra note 10. 
 44 See, e.g., What Are Loot Boxes?, PARENT ZONE, 
https://parentzone.org.uk/article/what-are-loot-boxes [http://perma.cc/G48K-VSJG]. 
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specific virtual items;45 others have banned the practice 
outright.46 The United States has yet to take significant 
regulatory action against loot boxes,47 and the Entertainment 
Software Association (“ESA,” the parent entity of the ESRB48) 
has announced its opinion that loot boxes categorically do not 
constitute gambling.49 
However, players,50 consumer advocates,51 and politicians52 
continue to voice their concerns about the practice. Academics have 
begun to examine the psychology driving loot box purchases; an 
empirical study has noted links between loot box purchases and 
problem gambling behavior.53 The federal government has also 
begun to take note; in August of 2019, the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) hosted a conference to hear the opinions of players, Industry 
associations, attorneys, consumer advocates, and academic 
researchers.54 The future of regulatory action against loot boxes in 
the United States is far from certain, and the present status quo 
grants the ESRB broad self-regulatory oversight over its member 
entities’ activities.55 Yet calls for enhanced regulation have not 
abated, and the precise mechanisms for direct government oversight 
remain uncharted. 
 
 45 T.J. Hafer, The Legal Status of Loot Boxes Around the World, and What’s Next in 
the Debate, PC GAMER (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.pcgamer.com/the-legal-status-of-loot-
boxes-around-the-world-and-whats-next/ [http://perma.cc/ZW4J-WJ32]. 
 46 Gaming Loot Boxes: What Happened When Belgium Banned Them?, BBC (Sept. 
12, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-49674333 [http://perma.cc/5QZA-4UW4]. 
 47 See Makena Kelly, Game Studios Would Be Banned from Selling Loot Boxes to 
Minors Under New Bill, VERGE (May 8, 2019, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/8/18536806/game-studios-banned-loot-boxes-minors-bill-
hawley-josh-blizzard-ea [http://perma.cc/9965-3YSU]. 
 48 Our History, ESRB, https://www.esrb.org/history/ (last visited May 3, 2020) 
[http://perma.cc/JW6Q-CS2W]. 
 49 See Paul Tassi, The ESRB Is Being Willfully Obtuse About Loot Boxes, And Will 
Never Be Any Help, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2018, 9:25 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2018/02/28/the-esrb-is-being-willfully-obtuse-about-
loot-boxes-and-will-never-be-any-help/#1959c0b76877 [http://perma.cc/8P5A-G47R]. 
 50 See, e.g., Will Fulton, Do Players Really Like Loot Boxes, or are Game Publishers Forcing 
Them on Us?, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/do-players-
like-loot-boxes/ [http://perma.cc/2K26-U72V]. 
 51 See, e.g., INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 33 (remarks of Jeff Haynes, Senior 
Editor of Video Games, Common Sense Media). 
 52 See, e.g., Chris Lee, Highlights of the Predatory Gaming Announcement, YOUTUBE 
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_akwfRuL4os [http://perma.cc/83QR-
477F]. 
 53 Zendle & Cairns, supra note 7. 
 54 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 10–11 (remarks of Andrew Smith, Director, 
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection). 
 55 See ESRB Introduces New Rating Process for Console Downloadable Video Games, 
ESRB (Apr. 18, 2011), https://www.esrb.org/blog/esrb-introduces-new-rating-process-for-
console-downloadable-video-games/ [http://perma.cc/2NPY-DETF] (featuring ESRB 
President’s claim that “Our rating system is widely considered to be among the most 
effective in the world, and ESRB continues to be an exemplary model of self-regulation.”). 
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II. THE FINANCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COSTS OF LOOT BOXES 
Ordinary consumers are bearing real psychological and 
financial costs as a result of the increased implementation of loot 
boxes.56 Mainstream reporting on the rise of loot boxes is replete 
with personal vignettes from parents discovering that their 
young children are being enticed to spend the equivalent of 
hundreds or thousands of dollars on loot boxes to chase desired 
items.57 However, children are not the only players affected; 
spouses and parents have also suffered familial strain as a result 
of their own compulsive spending on loot boxes.58 Writing about 
his loot box spending habits, one parent wrote, “I am currently 
$15,800 in debt. My wife no longer trusts me. My kids, who ask 
me why I am playing Final Fantasy all the time, will never 
understand how I selfishly spent money I should have been using 
for their activities.”59 Perhaps even more sobering are the stories 
of young adults who were introduced to the world of online 
gambling through loot boxes featured in sports games.60 Studies 
have noted that, on average, where non-problem gamblers spend 
only $2.50 on loot boxes every month, problem gamblers spend 
$25.61 
As one author noted, the video game “industry is certainly no 
stranger to moral panics and appeals to the judicial and 
legislative systems.”62 It is clear that regulations should not be 
haphazardly foisted upon an industry based upon scattered and 
anecdotal reports, in particular an industry as susceptible to 
public outrage and demonization as the video game industry, a 
trend just as common today63 as it was at the Industry’s 
inception.64 The revenue derived from loot boxes serves a 
 
 56 See, e.g., Mattha Busby, ‘Easy Trap to Fall Into’: Why Video-Game Loot Boxes 
Need Regulation, GUARDIAN (May 29, 2018, 1:50 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2018/may/29/gamers-politicians-regulation-video-
game-loot-boxes [http://perma.cc/NP62-Z45S]. 
 57 See, e.g., Kate Jackson, The Great Game Robbery: How Kids are Racking Up Bills 
Worth Thousands Buying ‘Loot Boxes’ on Games Like Fifa and Minecraft, THE SUN (Oct. 
22, 2019, 10:30 PM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/10192098/games-bill-loot-boxes/ 
[http://perma.cc/F9LD-YLN5]. 
 58 See, e.g., Busby, supra note 56. 
 59 Id. (emphasis of game title added). 
 60 See How My Son Went from Gamer to Compulsive Gambler, supra note 7.  
 61 Aaron Drummond et al., Loot Box Limit-Setting: A Potential Policy to Protect 
Video Game Users with Gambling Problems?, 114 ADDICTION 935, 935 (2019). 
 62 David J. Castillo, Unpacking the Loot Box: How Gaming’s Latest Monetization 
System Flirts with Traditional Grambling Methods, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 165, 175 
(2019). 
 63 See, e.g., Lisette Voytko, Trump Suggests Video Games Connected to Violence: 
Research Doesn’t Support That, FORBES (Aug. 5, 2019, 12:34 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisettevoytko/2019/08/05/trump-blames-video-games-for-
shootings-but-research-doesnt-support-that/#7c58d92611dc [http://perma.cc/NZ8P-JSNL]. 
 64 See, e.g., Stacie Ponder, 25 Years Later, ‘Disgusting’ Night Trap is Incredibly 
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meaningful purpose: Industry advocates have justified the 
inclusion of loot boxes in games by noting that they help to offset 
rising development costs65 and stagnant, or even falling, video 
game prices.66 
One of the strongest arguments in favor of loot box 
implementation is that it enables players to choose how much 
they wish to financially support a particular game.67 At the 2019 
FTC conference, Mike Warnecke of the ESA noted, “[W]hen 
people experience games, they want to be able to kick the tires on 
it and not . . . [buy] something until they have a chance to 
experience it. . . . [Y]ou have the chance to expand the content if 
you decide to like it.”68 Loot boxes undoubtedly allow players to 
vary their level of financial support for a particular game, and 
are not mandatory to progress in most, if not all, games that 
feature them.69 Indeed, Industry advocates frequently tout 
players’ choice and autonomy in deciding whether or not to buy 
loot boxes.70 
It is undeniable that loot boxes make modern-day games 
profitable for publishers71 and accessible to players who 
 cannot—or will not—pay anything to play.72 But one cannot 
ignore the impact the practice has on vulnerable individuals, who 
are suffering real-world financial and psychological costs 
associated with the increased implementation of loot boxes in 
modern video games. While legal and political decision-makers 
may ultimately decide to endorse the practice, the decision 
should not be made lightly or without confronting the human 
costs. 
A Vice author sought out the opinions of individuals on the 
subject, writing: 
I opened myself to a broad spectrum of stories and experiences. The 
individuals I spoke to ran a wide gamut of gaming contexts and age 
groups. They played across multiple platforms, from mobile to PC and 
console. Generally, these individuals had problems with one specific 
game rather than a problem spread across multiple titles. I did not 
observe a line between cosmetic economies, such as Overwatch, and 
economies that influence progression such as Battlefront II and 
 
Tame, KOTAKU (Aug. 15, 2017, 2:30 PM), https://kotaku.com/25-years-later-disgusting-
night-trap-is-incredibly-tam-1797864067 [http://perma.cc/9JGW-JTH6]. 
 65 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 25–26 (remarks of Sean Kane). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 26. 
 68 Id. at 45–46. 
 69 Id. at 46.  
 70 E.g., id. at 26, 46. 
 71 Id. at 59 (remarks of John Breyault). 
 72 See id. at 26 (remarks of Sean Kane). 
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Shadow of Mordor. The strongest common thread in all of these 
stories was a similar set of behaviors and impacts. The people I spoke 
to by-and-large described their spending on loot boxes as impulsive, 
shameful, and stress-inducing.73 
This description of loot boxes cuts against the Industry’s 
well-established narrative that players choose to purchase loot 
boxes as part of an informed process.74 One Industry advocate 
claimed, “No one is forced to spend money in a video game that is 
free to play. They choose what they want to spend and when they 
want to spend it and how they want to spend it.”75 But those 
words are difficult to reconcile with those of an affected player, 
who has spent several hundreds of dollars on loot boxes, who 
wrote: 
I felt compelled to spend on loot boxes every time a limited time event 
started so I wouldn’t miss out. . . . It warped my whole perception of 
the game into short periods of anxiety and stress where I had to spend 
money or play constantly on the hope of not missing out.76 
The harm inflicted by compulsive loot box spending goes 
beyond mere embarrassment. Affected individuals have reported 
intense feelings of shame and self-loathing.77 In a particularly 
chilling example, one correspondent in the Vice article confessed, 
“I ended up calling a suicide hotline that night. I felt distraught, 
pathetic, that I had just blown so much money on nothing but 
virtual jewels. I felt like I deserved to die for letting it get so bad 
and for wasting this much money.”78 
These players’ experiences are anything but unique,79 and 
language of compulsion and anxiety dominates first-hand player 
discussion of their encounters with loot boxes.80 It may be easy to 
 
 73 Ellen McGrody, For Many Players, Lootboxes are a Crisis That’s Already Here, 
VICE (Jan. 30, 2018, 11:08 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kznmwa/for-many-
players-lootboxes-are-a-crisis-thats-already-here [http://perma.cc/UD6V-SGKA]. 
 74 See, e.g., INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 26. 
 75 Id. 
 76 McGrody, supra note 73. 
 77 See id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See, e.g., Ethan Gach, Meet the 19-Year-Old Who Spent Over $17,000 on 
Microtransactions, KOTAKU (Nov. 30, 2017, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.kotaku.com.au/2017/11/meet-the-19-year-old-who-spent-over-17000-on-
microtransactions/ [http://perma.cc/SB94-FSPM]; Mike Wright, Children Spending £250 
on Fortnite ‘Skins’ to Avoid Being Labelled ‘The Poor Kid’ at School, Children’s 
Commissioner Warns, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 22, 2019, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/10/21/children-spending-250-fortnite-skins-avoid-
labeled-poor-kid/ [http://perma.cc/VYA2-6LNJ]; Zoe Kleinman, ‘My Son Spent £3,160 in 
One Game’, BBC (July 15, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48925623 
[http://perma.cc/N8H3-VS9P]. 
 80 See, e.g., Alysia Judge, Video Games and Mental Health: ‘Nobody’s Properly 
Talking’, BBC (July 14, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-44662669 
[http://perma.cc/SQ2V-6UFM]. 
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assume that such players are the exception, and that a few 
individuals with problematic gambling behaviors are simply 
making imprudent decisions, but that claim is far from reality.81 
It has become clear in academic circles that there is a 
statistically-significant correlation between loot box spending 
and problem gambling activity.82 Doctors David Zendle and Paul 
Cairns conducted a large-scale survey of video game players in 
order to evaluate the connection between these two behaviors.83 
The results of their research were sobering: 
This research provides empirical evidence of a relationship between 
loot box use and problem gambling. The relationship seen here was 
neither small, nor trivial. It was stronger than previously observed 
relationships between problem gambling and factors like alcohol 
abuse, drug use, and depression. Indeed, sub-group analyses revealed 
that an individual’s classification as either a non problem gambler or 
a problem gambler accounted for 37.7% of the variance in how much 
they spent on loot boxes. These results may confirm the existence of 
the causal relationship between buying loot boxes and problem 
gambling . . . . Due to the formal features that loot boxes share with 
other forms of gambling, they may well be acting as a ‘gateway’ to 
problem gambling amongst gamers. Hence, the more gamers spend on 
loot boxes, the more severe their problem gambling becomes.84 
They were quick to point out a significant caveat: “However, 
it is important to note that this is not the only causal 
relationship which fits the data. It may be the case that 
individuals who are already problem gamblers instead tend to 
spend more on loot boxes.”85 Uncertain of which way the causal 
arrow pointed, the authors posited: 
It may, indeed be the case that both directions of causality are true: 
Problem gamblers spend more on loot boxes, whilst buying loot boxes 
simultaneously leads to increases in problem gambling amongst 
gamers. However, regardless of which of these outcomes is the case, 
this research bears an important message when it comes to the 
regulation of loot boxes within the gaming industry. . . . It may be the 
case that this spending is leading to problem gambling. It may be that 
this level of spending is driven by pre-existing problem gambling 
amongst gamers. . . . However, in either case, this research provides 
industry bodies such as the ESRB with crucial evidence to use when 
determining whether there is still insufficient evidence of links between 
problem gambling and loot box use.86 
 
 81 See Zendle & Cairns, supra note 7. 
 82 Id. at 1, 3. 
 83 Id. at 3. 
 84 Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. (emphasis added). 
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This research illustrates a quantifiable connection between 
loot box spending and problem gambling behavior,87 providing 
academic support for the notion that loot boxes exploit or impose 
real psychological harm on a very real population of consumers. 
Finally, the authors of the study looked beyond the legal 
roadblocks to implementing loot box regulations and couched the 
matter in human terms: 
This study shows a relationship between loot box spending and 
problem gambling. . . . Furthermore, we believe that the strength of 
the relationship that was observed here between problem gambling 
and loot box spending suggests that important gambling-related harm 
is experienced by users of loot boxes. We strongly recommend that 
relevant national and federal regulatory authorities consider 
restricting access to loot boxes as if they were a form of gambling. . . . 
It is our opinion that this relationship remains serious and potentially 
dangerous regardless of whether loot boxes are technically considered a 
form of gambling or not.88 
While it is unclear whether loot boxes’ presence in video 
games first exposes individuals to further gambling-related 
harm, or merely exploits the existing problematic gambling 
tendencies of a subset of players, neither result can be considered 
trivial. Under both models, the Industry profits off of vulnerable 
individuals, whether it creates that vulnerability or merely 
exploits it. Further, the Industry is aware of, and indeed relies 
upon, the revenue derived from those individuals.89 
In writing on the topic of habit-forming design in phone 
applications and video games, Associate Professor Kyle 
Langvardt discussed the incentives developers have to maximize 
user “time on device,” both from an advertising and a 
microtransactional approach.90 He found that, while the majority 
of players pay little into microtransaction-heavy free-to-play 
games,91 “most revenue from micropayments is highly 
concentrated among a small group of apparent addicts who 
individually spend thousands of dollars on in-app purchases.”92 
Professor Langvardt further illustrated the problematic behavior 
of heavy spenders, indicating that “0.15 percent of mobile gamers 
account for 50 percent of the industry’s revenue from 
micropayments. About 1.9 percent make up 90 percent of 
 
 87 Id. at 3. 
 88 Id. at 9–10 (emphasis added). 
 89 See Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit-Forming Technology, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 
129, 140 (2019). 
 90 Id. at 134–46. 
 91 Id. at 140. 
 92 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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revenue.”93 He noted that the Industry refers to such players as 
“whales,” and recognize whales as one of their primary revenue 
streams in games of this kind.94 Indeed, Professor Langvardt 
hypothesized that the “unbalanced” rate at which whale and  
non-whale players paid into certain games “may give game 
developers strong incentives to encourage addiction-driven, 
whale-like purchases.”95 
Ultimately, Professor Langvardt concluded that habit-forming 
design poses “at least three types of harm: addiction, strain on social 
norms, and degradation of public discourse.”96 He discussed the 
relatively small population of individuals suffering from the World 
Health Organization-recognized “problem gaming disorder,”97 and 
likened the demographic trend to “the gambling industry, where only 
a small percentage of the population develops a serious habit.”98 This 
demonstrates that, as in the gambling industry, loot boxes can pose 
serious harms to individuals, even if the majority of people engaging 
in the activity walk away relatively unscathed. 
The Industry’s leadership in recognizing these harms has 
been sorely lacking.99 Professor Langvardt noted that “Industry 
leaders in both the tech and gambling sectors emphasize the 
behavioral nature of the problem, and they suggest that they are 
not responsible for the small minority’s problems with impulse 
control.”100 This moralizing disavowal of responsibility fails to 
account for the fact that, behind the scenes, the Industry relies 
heavily on such vulnerable individuals in monetizing its 
products.101 Professor Langvardt remarked, “Developers have 
strong incentives to drive problem use, just as casinos do, and 
they make every effort to do so.”102 
 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 141. 
 96 Id. at 146. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id.; see also Ferris Jabr, Can You Really be Addicted to Video Games?, N.Y TIMES 
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/magazine/can-you-really-be-
addicted-to-video-games.html [http://perma.cc/JLL8-FM9U]. 
 99 Langvardt, supra note 89, at 146. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 140–41; see also PocketGamerbiz, Let’s Go Whaling: Tricks for Monetising 
Mobile Game Players with Free-to-Play, YOUTUBE (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xNjI03CGkb4&ab_channel=PocketGamerbiz 
[http://perma.cc/LGZ5-UERR] (depicting CEO of a developer speaking at a conference, 
describing his presentation, entitled “Let’s go Whaling!,” as follows: “It is about a 
summary of a huge bunch of behavioral psychology, so the tricks on how to monetize a 
game well. Some of you will probably be slightly shocked by all the tricks I have listed 
here, but I’ll leave the morality of it out of the talk, we can discuss it if we have time 
later.”). 
 102 Langvardt, supra note 89, at 147. 
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It is necessary to consider the words of the Industry’s own 
representatives in defending these problematic practices. 
Speaking at the 2019 FTC workshop, Sean Kane, a 
representative of “more than 100 video game companies,”103 
attempted to normalize problem users’ heavy spending as a 
purely volitional activity, claiming, “I don’t think that we, as an 
industry, needs [sic] to step into that parental role, though, 
because some of these people are not children. . . . Some of these 
people are our age and they’re spending $1,000 on a game that 
they love and this is their way of relaxing after a hard day’s 
work.”104 It is difficult to characterize these whales’ spending 
patterns as knowing purchases, however. 
Some game mechanisms cloud just how much a player is 
spending on loot boxes and other microtransactions by employing 
in-game currencies purchased with real-world money,105 a level of 
abstraction that can impede players’ ability to evaluate the 
financial consequences of their purchases.106 The Industry 
defends the practice of using in-game currencies as one that 
helps “to maintain a player’s sense of immersion in the game.”107 
In its staff perspective write-up a year after the 2019 FTC 
conference, the FTC recognized as one of its “key takeaways” that 
in-game currencies “may confuse some players, as it essentially 
requires a player to remember the real currency to in-game 
currency ‘exchange rate’ and calculate it for every transaction.”108 
At the same 2019 FTC conference, a panelist from the 
National Consumers League, John Breyault, noted the following 
concerning in-game currency: 
So I’d like to turn now to a specific issue that we’re looking at, which 
is the use of in-game currency. As you’ve heard from the other 
panelists, in-game currency has proliferated throughout the top 
games. In FIFA, you’ve got FIFA coins. In NBA 2K19, you’ve got VC. 
In Overwatch, you’ve got credits. . . . So the currencies obtained via 
gameplay or purchase, our concern is that they may obscure the true 
cost of purchasing in-game content. So does it actually tell you how 
 
 103 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 14. 
 104 Id. at 100. 
 105 Id. at 62–63. 
 106 Id. at 66–67; see also Brendan Sinclair, Is it Time to Retire Virtual Currency?, 
GAMESINDUSTRY (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2019-09-20-is-
it-time-to-retire-virtual-currency [http://perma.cc/LAU4-LRJZ] (discussing the lubricating 
effect in-game currency has on players’ decisions to purchase microtransactions, by 
reducing “friction points” and “opportunities for a consumer to consider whether they 
really want to spend this money”). 
 107 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC VIDEO GAME LOOT BOX WORKSHOP: STAFF PERSPECTIVE 
4 (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/staff-perspective-paper-loot-
box-workshop/loot_box_workshop_staff_perspective.pdf [http://perma.cc/24CA-EUCZ]. 
 108 Id. 
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much you’re spending in real money down the line? . . . When 
something’s priced at $1.99, you may not think that this is $2 and be 
more likely to spend money on it. . . . The problem here is that when 
you combine this with things like these bonuses that are offered here, 
it puts a lot of cognitive load on the user, creating a complex exchange 
rate between digital money and real dollars. And it can make it easy 
to lose track of an object’s real world value.109 
The piecemeal nature in which microtransactions, loot boxes 
included, extract money from players ultimately causes players 
to spend more on a free to play game in total than they would 
have likely consented to spend in advance.110 In order to address 
the difficulties surrounding in-game currencies, Section VI below 
advocates for limit-setting practices as one of several new 
regulatory mechanisms to be implemented in video games. 
Because of developer incentives to drive problematic use and 
because of the absence of a meaningful Industry response in the 
face of demonstrated links between loot boxes and problem 
gambling behavior, it is patently unwise to defer to the Industry 
as a self-regulatory authority. Concerned consumers must look 
elsewhere for protection, namely their governments. The function 
of a government’s police power is to protect its citizens from 
physical harms and perceived social evils.111 The manner and 
extent to which that power is exercised is a question of policy and 
preference, but its existence cannot be denied.112 There is a 
longstanding history in the United States of government 
intervention to protect individuals from predatory and harmful 
corporate behavior, such as in the decades-long regulatory fight 
with the tobacco industry.113 As explained in Section VI below, 
government loot box regulation is a viable method to address the 
harms discussed thus far, a remedy forestalled only by 
misconceptions about the number and type of individuals affected 
by loot boxes, as well as disinterest by existing regulatory 
authorities. It is clear that loot boxes harm certain individuals, 
 
 109 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 62–63. (emphasis of game titles added). 
 110 See Langvardt, supra note 89, at 135; see also INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 94 (“I 
don’t think that simply saying on a box that you have any in-app purchases available 
adequately informs your typical parent or consumer just about the level of investment that 
goes into trying to get people to spend more on a game or in the app.”); id. at 180 (“It’s very 
hard for consumers to know what they’re getting, what it’s going to cost.”). 
 111 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 8 (2020); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope 
of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 430 (2004). 
 112 See Barnett, supra note 111, at 430. 
 113 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BANTHIN, TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, 
REGULATING TOBACCO RETAILERS: OPTIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1 
(2010); see also Ned Sharpless & Mitch Zeller, Achievements in Tobacco Regulation Over 
the Past Decade and Beyond, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-
voices/achievements-tobacco-regulation-over-past-decade-and-beyond (last updated Aug. 
20, 2019) [http://perma.cc/PJX2-TFFY]. 
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both financially114 and psychologically.115 As constituents become 
better-informed of the pervasiveness and effects of loot boxes, 
they can press elected and regulatory officials to take action. 
Whether that action can take the form of enforcement under 
existing gambling statutes would require a court to find that loot 
boxes amounted to a form of gambling, discussed further below. 
III. LOOT BOXES AS GAMBLING 
The controversy over whether loot boxes are a form of 
gambling (“the gambling determination”) continues to rage.116 
The Industry’s advocates have been quick to rebut claims to that 
effect, seeking to distinguish traditional gambling activity from 
the experience of opening a loot box.117 The ESRB, an entity 
purporting to serve as a self-regulator the video game industry, 
weighed in on the controversy by writing to gaming news source 
Kotaku: 
ESRB does not consider loot boxes to be gambling. . . . While there’s 
an element of chance in these mechanics, the player is always 
guaranteed to receive in-game content (even if the player 
unfortunately receives something they don’t want). We think of it as a 
similar principle to collectible card games: Sometimes you’ll open a 
pack and get a brand new holographic card you’ve had your eye on for 
a while. But other times you’ll end up with a pack of cards you already 
have.118 
In evaluating whether to take steps to regulate loot boxes, 
states and nations have grappled with this labelling issue.119 
Countries that have concluded that loot boxes are not a form of 
gambling have not meaningfully regulated them.120 Countries 
 
 114 See, e.g., McGrody, supra note 73. 
 115 See, e.g., Zendle & Cairns, supra note 7. 
 116 See, e.g., Andrew V. Moshirnia, Precious and Worthless: A Comparative 
Perspective on Loot Boxes and Gambling, 20 MINN. J.L. SCI & TECH. 77, 77–78 (2019) 
(noting that loot boxes are unlikely to be labeled gambling in the United States, and 
advocating instead for “transparency-based” solutions); see also Loot Boxes Are a 
Lucrative Game of Chance, But Are They Gambling?, NPR (Oct. 10, 2019, 5:08 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/10/769044790/loot-boxes-are-a-lucrative-game-of-chance-but-
are-they-gambling [http://perma.cc/339C-L4LR]; Hong, supra note 13 at 65–67 (arguing 
loot boxes constitute gambling under the California Penal Code, with a particular focus on 
protecting minors). 
 117 Jason Schreier, ESRB Says It Doesn’t See ‘Loot Boxes’ as Gambling, KOTAKU (Oct. 
11, 2017, 12:46 PM), https://kotaku.com/esrb-says-it-doesnt-see-loot-boxes-as-gambling-
1819363091 [http://perma.cc/GJ65-YRFZ]. 
 118 Id.  
 119 See Alex Hern & Rob Davies, Video Game Loot Boxes Should Be Classed as 
Gambling, Says Commons, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2019, 1:01 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2019/sep/12/video-game-loot-boxes-should-be-
classed-as-gambling-says-commons [http://perma.cc/M5RY-Z9YK]. 
 120 See Zoe Kleinman, Fifa Packs and Loot Boxes ‘Not Gambling’ in UK, BBC (July 
22, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49074003 [http://perma.cc/DM5N-UK7S]. 
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that have come to the opposite conclusion have heavily regulated 
or outright banned the practice.121 As a result, the resolution of 
this issue one way or the other can have serious financial 
ramifications for the Industry.122 While some Industry 
spokespeople seek to characterize the gambling comparison as 
misinformed,123 it seems imprudent to take their word for it 
without further engaging with the issue. Considering that the 
governments of multiple nations have found against the ESA’s 
position that loot boxes are not a form of gambling,124 the 
controversy is a far cry from being neatly resolved. 
A. Defining Gambling 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines gambling as “[t]he act of 
risking something of value, esp. money, for a chance to win a 
prize.”125 While state statutes differ in the precise wording of 
their gambling definitions, they all focus on the elements of (1) a 
wager of something of value for (2) a valuable prize awarded 
through (3) random chance.126 Some statutes directly 
acknowledge that not all activities featuring prizes are gambling, 
such as contests of skill.127 Regardless of the precise wording of a 
particular statute, all traditional gambling activity, by nature, 
requires a participant to risk something of value (i.e. 
consideration).128 It is only after a participant risks something of 
value that they are eligible to win a prize.129 However, as anyone 
 
 121 See Tom Gerken, Video Game Loot Boxes Declared Illegal Under Belgium 
Gambling Laws, BBC (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43906306 
[http://perma.cc/YE7E-NBAW]. 
 122 See, e.g., Alex Hern, Square Enix Pulls Three Games from Belgium After Loot Box 
Ban, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2018, 4:57 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2018/nov/21/square-enix-pulls-games-mobius-final-
fantasy-belgium-loot-box-ban [http://perma.cc/H5HA-SAY4]; see also Amrita Khalid, 
Nintendo Pulls Two Mobile Games in Belgium Due to Loot Box Laws, ENGADGET (May 21, 
2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019-05-21-nintendo-pulls-two-mobile-games-in-
belgium-due-to-loot-box-laws.html [http://perma.cc/2QFJ-78U5]; Paul Tassi, EA 
Surrenders in Belgian FIFA Ultimate Team Loot Box Fight, Raising Potential Red Flags, 
FORBES (Jan. 29, 2019, 10:23 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2019/01/29/ea-
surrenders-in-belgian-fifa-ultimate-team-loot-box-fight-raising-potential-red-
flags/#2a4b366d3675 [http://perma.cc/KHX8-74L4]. 
 123 See, e.g., Tae Kim, State Legislators Call EA’s Game a ‘Star Wars-Themed Online 
Casino’ Preying on Kids, Vow Action, CNBC (Nov. 22, 2017, 8:57 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/22/state-legislators-call-eas-game-a-star-wars-themed-
online-casino-preying-on-kids-vow-action.html [http://perma.cc/VEU2-Y8UH].  
 124 See Shabana Arif, The Netherlands Starts Enforcing Its Loot Box Ban, IGN (June 
20, 2018, 3:07 AM), https://www.ign.com/articles/2018/06/20/the-netherlands-starts-
enforcing-its-loot-box-ban [http://perma.cc/QU8E-Q2DV]; see also Gerken, supra note 121. 
 125 Gambling, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 126 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0237 (2005). 
 127 See id. 
 128 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 2 (2020). 
 129 See id. 
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passingly familiar with the concept of gambling can attest, 
simply being eligible to win does not guarantee that result. 
Uncertainty is inherent in all gambling activity.130 
However, the definition of gambling in Black’s Law 
Dictionary is not sufficient on its own. In order to meaningfully 
discuss whether loot boxes are a form of gambling, a baseline 
definition must be established.131 While many of the generalized 
terms employed in the dictionary definition are reflected time 
and again in state gambling laws, their arrangement and 
emphasis varies.132 Historically, the federal government has only 
stepped in to regulate gambling where it meaningfully 
encroaches upon the realm of interstate commerce.133 As a result, 
the decision whether and how to regulate gambling has largely 
fallen to the respective states, each of which makes its own policy 
determination.134 Indeed, the ability to regulate gambling is 
perhaps one of the most iconic and well-settled exercises of a 
state’s police power.135 As such, we must look to state laws to 
begin to define gambling. Some states, like California, regulate 
gambling activity broadly.136 In listing the forms of gambling 
conduct it prohibits as a misdemeanor, California law provides: 
Every person who deals, plays, or carries on, opens, or causes to be 
opened, or who conducts, either as owner or employee, whether for 
hire or not, any game of faro, monte, roulette, lansquenet, rouge et 
noire, rondo, tan, fan-tan, seven-and-a-half, twenty-one, hokey-pokey, 
or any banking or percentage game played with cards, dice, or any 
device, for money, checks, credit, or other representative of value, and 
every person who plays or bets at or against any of those prohibited 
games, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punishable by a fine 
not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand 
dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding 
six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment.137 
Washington state defines gambling as “staking or risking 
something of value upon the outcome of a contest of chance or a 
future contingent event not under the person’s control or 
influence, upon an agreement or understanding that the person 
or someone else will receive something of value in the event of a 
certain outcome.”138 Of particular interest is the statute’s focus 
 
 130 See id. 
 131 Castillo, supra note 62, at 183. 
 132 See, e.g., Castillo, supra note 62, at 183–84. 
 133 See Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 344 (1903). 
 134 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 8 (2020). 
 135 See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 8 (2020). 
 136 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 330 et seq. (1991). 
 137 CAL. PENAL CODE § 330 (1991) (emphasis added). 
 138 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0237 (2005). 
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on whether the result of the activity is within a purported 
gambler’s “control or influence,” and the necessary implication 
that activities involving results within a player’s control do not 
constitute gambling.139 
Other states, perhaps most famously Nevada, embrace 
gambling activity by permitting it statewide and reap its 
economic benefits as a result.140 Under Nevada law: “‘Gaming’ or 
‘gambling’ means to deal, operate, carry on, conduct, maintain or 
expose for play any game as defined [by state law], or to operate 
an inter-casino linked system.”141 Nevada further defines “Game” 
as “any game played with cards, dice, equipment or any 
mechanical, electromechanical or electronic device or machine for 
money, property, checks, credit or any representative of 
value . . . .”142 
While some states may elect to enact detailed gambling laws, 
state statutes need not define gambling to avoid being 
unconstitutionally vague.143 Perhaps as an inevitable result, 
states can define the term loosely to suit their needs. It is 
therefore necessary to view the broad constellation of state 
gambling definitions to determine its common elements.144 
Based upon a review of multiple state gambling statutes, one 
author advanced the following working gambling definition: “any 
activity in which consideration is given in a game of chance in 
return for a prize.”145 This Article adopts the same definition for 
purposes of discussion and critique. Where other scholarly 
articles have examined loot boxes under these elements and 
determined that a court would be unlikely to hold their use to be 
gambling activity,146 this Article comes to the opposite conclusion. 
As argued in detail below, players and game developers treat loot 
 
 139 See id. 
 140 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.010 et seq. (2019) (also known as the “Nevada 
Gaming Control Act,” in which the Nevada Legislature expressly “[found], and declare[d] 
to be the public policy of this state, that… the gaming industry is vitally important to the 
economy of the State and general welfare of the inhabitants.”) 
 141 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.0153 (2019). 
 142 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.0152 (2020) (emphasis added). 
 143 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 1 (2019). 
 144 Castillo, supra note 62, at 183 (“[B]y examining various state statutes’ definition 
of gambling and gambling instruments, a working definition begins to emerge.”). 
 145 Id. at 184. 
 146 See id. at 192 (noting that the believed-to-be-absent element of “value” could be 
found by “more technically-literate court judges [who could] judge ‘value’ in more than 
just monetary terms,” but concluding that as of yet, “[u]ntil such a shift in perception 
occurs the in-game items received from loot boxes cannot be considered value”); see also 
Mann, supra note 13, at 227 (concluding that “current case law and statutory definitions 
are inadequate to classify loot boxes as gambling outright”); Moshirnia, supra note 116, at 
99 (“Nor would loot boxes qualify as gambling if one considers the virtual items to be 
worthless.”). 
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box contents as things of value; in many games, those contents 
are often resold for value in player-to-player transactions with 
the direct sanction of the developer. This Article further argues 
that the money players pay in order to purchase loot boxes 
constitutes valuable consideration. The gambling determination, 
therefore, turns largely upon whether a loot box contains an item 
of independent value, received at random, for which the 
purchaser pays consideration.147 
As authors have noted,148 and as the ESRB conceded in its 
own statement on the subject,149 the element of “chance” is 
clearly present in opening a loot box, and as such this Article will 
not further discuss it. Instead, it will engage with the stronger 
argument against the presence of the element of a valuable prize 
and, to a lesser extent, consideration. 
B. Valuable Prize 
In order to evaluate whether a loot box’s contents have 
independent value, we must consider the reasons why players 
buy loot boxes in the first place. Are they seeking one or more 
specific advertised items, and all other results are 
disappointments? Or are they paying for a virtual lightshow, 
unconcerned with the specific contents of their loot box? Industry 
representatives frequently contend that loot boxes are not a form 
of gambling because a loot box always gives the player 
something.150 From the perspective of such advocates, the “value” 
derived from a loot box transaction is the guaranteed receipt of 
any one or more items inside the loot box.151 But this 
interpretation assumes and disregards much. Certainly, a player 
who receives a free loot box as part of an in-game promotion 
might open it out of idle curiosity, or a desire to receive 
something, anything. That player cannot be disappointed, 
because a loot box will always give him something, whether it be 
a “skin” (a recolor or texture swap for an existing in-game asset, 
with no practical gameplay effects), in-game currency, a 
consumable item, or any number of other possible in-game 
effects152 (hereinafter referred to as “items”). But such a player 
has not purchased his loot box. 
 
 147 See Castillo, supra note 62, at 183. 
 148 Id. at 187–88. 
 149 Schreier, supra note 117. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See id. 
 152 See Vance, supra note 3 (providing ESRB definition which states loot boxes “are 
like locked treasure chests that contain an array of virtual items that can be used in the 
game once unlocked.”). 
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Players who purchase loot boxes are making a decision, 
consciously or not, to enter into a monetary transaction.153 It is clear 
that such paying players desire something from their purchased 
loot boxes. The issue then becomes whether a paying player is 
purchasing loot boxes for the experience of opening the loot box,154 
or to seek one or more specific items.155 If one player—let’s call him 
Jace—is simply purchasing the experience, a talking point adopted 
by some Industry advocates,156 then he has received a guaranteed 
thing of value for his purchase. Jace opened his loot box and got an 
item. He got what he paid for. Ergo, the Industry proclaims, not 
gambling.157 
This interpretation is flawed. To illustrate: a one-dollar slot 
machine that always paid out at least one penny would still 
amount to gambling activity—the “guaranteed” receipt of a 
nominal prize would not invalidate the larger game being played. 
Further, while Jace might be finding value in the chase itself 
(rather than any particular prize), this makes the practice more 
akin to gambling, not less.158 
But what of the other player—let’s call her Liliana—who has 
no interest in most of the possible items in the loot box, and sees 
them simply as chaff through which she must sift to unearth the 
solitary gem that she desires? Depending on the manner in which 
that particular video game is monetized, Liliana may not have 
the option159 to purchase the item directly from the loot box. In 
 
 153 See Imran Khan, Loot Box Bill Officially Introduced to Senate, GAMEINFORMER 
(May 23, 2019, 1:05 PM), https://www.gameinformer.com/2019/05/23/loot-box-bill-
officially-introduced-to-us-senate [http://perma.cc/VMK9-QD6Z] (quoting text of 
unnumbered bill in U.S. Senate that defines “loot box” in pertinent part as “an add-on 
transaction to an interactive digital entertainment product”). 
 154 See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 127–28 (remarks of Dr. Andrey Simonov). 
 155 See id. at 9 (“There have been anecdotal reports of consumers spending hundreds 
to thousands of dollars in pursuit of coveted items. . . . In addition, do consumers, 
especially children or adolescents, adequately understand what they're purchasing and 
how much time or money they're spending? Are the disclosures adequate? For example, 
disclosures about the odds of obtaining specific loot box items, especially if those odds may 
change depending on game behavior.”). 
 156 See id. at 116–17, 121–30. 
 157 See Moshirnia, supra note 116, at 98–99. 
 158  See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 127 (“[M]aybe consumers just play loot 
boxes because they get some utility from a risk. . . . And this is really problematic because 
this is the same as [in] casinos, and it can lead to problem gambling, to addiction, and to 
all stories like this.”). 
 159 It is worth noting that a prominent video game featuring loot boxes, Activision-
Blizzard’s Overwatch, adopts a hybrid model. Under this model, players receive free loot 
boxes periodically for playing games and logging in, while also having the opportunity to 
buy as many loot boxes as they wish through the in-game store. Any item in a loot box is 
also available for purchase using the in-game currency known as “credits.” Credits cannot 
be purchased directly and instead must be acquired by opening loot boxes, which pay 
them out in lots of 50, 150, 200, and 500 according to the rarity of the bundle of credits 
contained in a particular loot box. Duplicate items received from loot boxes award a 
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that case, she must roll up her sleeves and begin to open loot 
boxes, one by one, until she finds what she is looking for or 
abandons her search out of frustration or economic necessity. 
Liliana would have paid out real money for the mere chance to 
receive what she desired. Even if she is ultimately successful, her 
success could have come after opening one loot box or one 
hundred. The solitary item she desired could have cost her wildly 
different amounts of money. Initial research suggests that most 
loot box purchasers adopt this approach, and “open loot boxes 
mainly for functional value . . . .”160 
One might consider the above distinction to be largely 
philosophical. What do players personally value? Why should the 
Industry be regulated in dealing with Liliana if they would be 
free to deal with Jace? Indeed, Industry advocates have often 
emphasized players’ decision to purchase loot boxes as an act of 
self-expression,161 noting that often loot box contents are entirely 
cosmetic and confer no gameplay advantages.162 These 
arguments tend to frame the discussion around loot boxes in 
terms of player agency and expression.163 The ESA laid out its 
position as follows: 
Loot boxes are a voluntary feature in certain video games that provide 
players with another way to obtain virtual items that can be used to 
enhance their in-game experiences. They are not gambling. . . . In 
some games, they have elements that help a player progress through 
the video game. In others, they are optional features and are not 
required to progress or succeed in the game. In both cases, the gamer 
makes the decision.164 
 
prorated amount of credits as well. A “Rare” skin (featuring a simple color palette swap of 
that character’s original model) for a particular character costs 250 credits to be directly 
unlocked, while a new “Legendary” skin for that character (incorporating new visual and 
audio effects and a more radically altered character model) will cost 3,000 credits. A 
player could either choose to open their free loot boxes (augmenting them with paid loot 
boxes as desired) until they got the skin they wanted, or they could use their credits to 
purchase the skin directly. The purpose of this footnote is to illustrate that, even though 
players can unlock skins “directly” in Overwatch, the currency to do so must be accrued by 
opening loot boxes. A player attempting to acquire a limited-time skin may not have 
enough time to purchase that skin directly with their available credits, and will instead 
need to purchase multiple loot boxes to either find the skin by chance or accrue enough 
credits to unlock it manually. See, e.g., Daniel Friedman, Want Overwatch to Get Rid of 
Loot Boxes? It Might Get More Expensive, POLYGON (Sep. 5, 2018, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.polygon.com/2018/9/5/17822966/overwatch-loot-boxes-skins-events 
[http://perma.cc/EW2X-ZAH5] (discussing Overwatch’s in-game economy). 
 160  See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 130. 
 161 Id. at 22 (remarks of Sean Kane). 
 162 Id. at 30–31. 
 163 Id. at 22 (“[C]ustomization in games is exceedingly popular and it’s something 
that [players] do to really interact with their friends. They love to be able to show off some 
sort of new element that allows their game character to more reflect their own 
personality.”). 
 164 Hannah Dwan, Hawaii to Crack Down on ‘Predatory’ Loot Boxes in Video Games 
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In evaluating the ESA’s above defense of the practice, 
Professor Andrew V. Moshirnia noted the wrongheadedness of 
discussing free will and choice in arguing whether a practice 
amounts to gambling.165 Professor Moshirnia wrote: 
Unsurprisingly, the Entertainment Software Association (ESA), a 
trade association, has strongly opposed any suggestion that loot boxes 
are a form of gambling. ESA has wrongly made this argument based 
on the voluntary nature of the activity, rather than the relative value 
of resulting items. . . . The ESA’s approach is odd as gambling 
definitions do not typically revolve around volition—it is assumed that 
bets do not place themselves and that a viewer can watch a race 
without placing a wager.166 
Further, player-agency arguments disregard the economic 
value that players167 and game developers168 themselves assign to 
specific items in their loot boxes. 
The Industry is nevertheless hesitant to characterize loot box 
contents as things of real-world value, and prefers to discuss 
them as fun add-ons.169 This view is somewhat supported by the 
monetization structure of some video games, in which players 
cannot trade the items they receive from loot boxes—the items 
are permanently associated with individual accounts.170 One 
might wonder how the contents of a loot box can be things of 
value if they cannot be shared, traded, or sold off. Under such a 
system, one might imagine players enter into a loot box 
transaction with the understanding that they are receiving 
nothing of value, because they cannot sell it off and will 
eventually stop playing that particular game. 
This notion does not overcome loot boxes’ similarity to 
traditional gambling activity for two reasons: (1) it fails to 
acknowledge that many things of value cannot be shared or later 
sold off, and (2) it also fails to take into account the many online 
games in which loot box contents can and are traded and resold 
 
Following Star Wars Battlefront 2 Controversy, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 27, 2017, 4:57 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/gaming/news/hawaii-crack-predatory-loot-boxes-video-games/ 
[http://perma.cc/AA7W-GCEW]. 
 165 Moshirnia, supra note 116, at 95–96. 
 166 Id. 
 167 See, e.g., Joseph Knoop, The Most Expensive CS:GO Skins of 2017, PCGAMER (Nov. 30, 
2017), http://www.pcgamer.com/csgo-skins-most-expensive [http://perma.cc/5CDU-BHRR]. 
 168 See, e.g., Maddie Level, Unboxing the Issue: The Future of Video Game Loot Boxes 
in the U.S., KAN. L. REV. 201, 216 (2019) (“Likewise, in games where the items contained 
in loot boxes are categorized [by developers] by frequency and rarity, value is inherently 
assigned to the items.”). 
 169 See, e.g., INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 22. 
 170 See id. at 69–70. 
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for considerable sums of money with the direct support of the 
game developer.171 
To the first point: individuals frequently pay money for 
services, such as haircuts and car washes, that cannot later be 
re-sold or cashed out, and the benefits of which diminish over 
time. That is not to say, however, that these services lack 
value.172 The Industry’s logic with regard to loot boxes assumes 
that the ability to trade something is integral to whether that 
thing is valuable. But the Industry’s logic is faulty. It is 
irrelevant whether the contents of a loot box are freely tradable, 
as a court could find that the payment of cash for an uncertain, 
nontransferable prize amounts to gambling activity regardless. 
However, it is important to note that at least one nation, the 
Netherlands, has only found gambling activity to take place 
when the contents of those loot boxes are transferable as part of 
real-world transactions.173 
To the second point: in games where players are allowed to 
trade amongst themselves, in-game items can command  
real-world prices. Some online marketplaces, such as Valve’s 
Steam Community Market (“Steam”), allow players to buy and 
sell items from a host of affiliated games, many of which were 
originally exclusively obtained from a loot box mechanism.174 
Steam places an $1800 limit on any single transaction, and 
charges a five percent transaction fee.175 Individual game 
developers determine whether they wish to enable player-to-
player trading through Steam’s market.176 This serves as further 
evidence that many developers acknowledge in-game items to be 
things of value, and directly profit from selling loot boxes to 
players, knowing and intending for those players to in turn resell 
the loot boxes’ contents for cash. 
 
 171 See Jeremy Laukkonen, Steam Community Market: What It Is and How to Use It, 
LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/steam-community-market-what-it-is-and-how-to-use-
it-4586933 [http://perma.cc/T2GW-9FD8] (last updated Oct. 17, 2019). 
 172 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287, 297 
(1988) (providing a helpful overview of John Locke’s labor theory of property, noting in 
pertinent part that, human “labor adds value to the goods, if in no other way than by 
allowing them to be enjoyed by a human being.”). 
 173 Loot Boxes & Netherlands Gaming Authority’s Findings, DUTCH GAMES ASS’N, 
http://dutchgamesassociation.nl/news/loot-boxes-netherlands-gaming-authoritys-findings 
[http://perma.cc/U64K-TPXM] (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). 
 174 See, e.g., Laukkonen, supra note 171. 
 175 Community Market FAQ, STEAM, 
http://support.steampowered.com/kb_article.php?ref=6088-udxm-7214 
[http://perma.cc/A5D4-3P8L] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
 176 Id. (“It is up to the game developer to decide whether or not they want to 
participate in the Community Market.”). 
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Evidence that players themselves assign value to these  
in-game items can be found in the steep prices they are often willing 
to pay for them. For example, players of Counter-Strike: Global 
Offensive (a first-person shooter game with military themes) trade 
skins for the guns they use in ordinary gameplay.177 Some of the 
rarer skins, originally obtained through a loot box mechanism, have 
commanded staggering prices; in one extreme case, a skin called 
“Dragon Lore” sold for $61,000.178 
That is not to say that players are arbitrarily finding value 
in particular items despite game developers’ best intentions; 
developers themselves are well aware that certain items are 
more highly sought-after than others, and indeed engineer them 
to be as such. The manner in which they advertise these rarer 
items, such as releasing promotional videos highlighting 
particular items and emphasizing their time-limited nature,179 
suggests that developers intend players to urgently seek out 
these items in particular. Furthermore, developers entirely 
control the scarcity of a particular item by setting the percentage 
chance of a particular item appearing in any given loot box180 
(known colloquially as the “drop rate”181). These drop rates can be 
variable, and where variable, can lead to complicated payout 
structures.182 By setting certain items to have a lower drop rate 
 
 177  Andy Chalk, CS:GO ‘Dragon Lore’ AWP Skin Sells for More than $61,000, 
PCGAMER (Jan. 31, 2018), http://www.pcgamer.com/csgo-dragon-lore-awp-skin-sells-for-
more-than-61000 [http://perma.cc/RNR8-VNHF]. 
 178 Id. 
 179 See, e.g., PlayOverwatch, Overwatch Seasonal Event Lunar New Year 2020, 
YOUTUBE (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eLnET-0CI4M 
[http://perma.cc/PTN7-D6TQ]. 
 180 See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 33, 49. 
 181 See id. at 49. 
 182 To illustrate the complexity that can be involved in the implementation of a 
particular variable-rate loot box mechanic, refer to the example below.  
In Nintendo’s free-to-play mobile game, Fire Emblem Heroes, new collectible items (in this 
case fantasy characters to be added to a player’s “barracks”) are introduced into the game 
at regular intervals, often in sets of three or four. Those characters are advertised as 
being available in a particular loot box (referred to in this game as a “banner”). New 
characters often boast unique weapons or abilities, many of which a player can transfer to 
their existing characters. A player seeking to receive one or more advertised characters 
must spend in-game currency (purchased with real-world money) in order to receive a 
randomized character from the banner. The chance to receive a featured character (a 
“focus hero”) is 3% on most banners. Players also have a separate 3% chance to receive a 
different, randomized character of the same level of rarity from a prior banner (a “non-
focus hero”). The other 94% of the time, the player will receive a randomized character of 
a lower rarity from throughout the game’s history. Fire Emblem Heroes tracks whether or 
not a player has received a high-rarity character, and gradually improves the rate at 
which the rarest characters are available (referred to colloquially as the “pity rate”) in 
increments of 0.25% for every five characters received without receiving a character of the 
highest rarity, resetting to 3% for both focus heroes and non-focus heroes once one or the 
other has been obtained. This creates an incentive for a player to continue to continue to 
spend as their pity rate increases and the opportunity to receive their desired prize 
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than other items (essentially making those items more “rare”), 
game developers are tacitly acknowledging that they expect some 
items to be more desirable or useful to their players. For these 
reasons, it is disingenuous to claim that monetary value is not 
often assigned to loot box items, or that particular items are not 
more highly valued than others. 
One author concluded that the “prize” element would be found 
lacking in United States courts, based upon a two-pronged 
analysis.183 In the first prong, the author relied in part on the fact 
that games made by Electronic Arts (“EA”) and Activision-Blizzard 
contained terms of service that expressly forbade account trading.184 
The author discussed the case of Kater v. Churchill Downs 
Incorporated,185 noting that an item that merely extended gameplay 
did not constitute sufficient value to meet the definition of 
gambling,186 and further that a game company could not be held 
responsible for real-world trading enabled by third parties in 
violation of the game’s terms of service.187 
In Kater, a player attempted to bring a class action suit 
against the operators of a virtual casino, seeking recovery under 
a Washington state lost-gambling-funds statute, the Washington 
Consumer Protection Act, as well as an unjust enrichment claim 
against the casino.188 Gameplay required users to purchase and 
spend virtual chips to extend their time in the virtual casino.189 
While the game included a feature allowing users to transfer 
their chips to other players, the game only allowed players to do 
so gratuitously.190 Nevertheless, a secondary market existed, 
 
improves. Starting a “summoning session” (the term the game uses to describe the loot 
box mechanism through which players acquire characters) costs five “orbs,” the in-game 
currency. The player then may choose from one of five doors, which are color-coded among 
four possible colors (red, green, blue, and gray) in order to indicate, broadly, what type of 
weapon that character uses. Players seeking a particular character will know that 
character’s weapon color, which is advertised in advance, and can select the corresponding 
door. The door is then opened, and the player receives a character of the chosen weapon 
color. The player may then choose to continue opening the remaining four doors (for a 
cumulative cost of 20 orbs if all five doors are opened) or may abandon the summoning 
session. Three orbs can be purchased via the Google Store at any time for $1.99. Orbs are 
available in other quantities, up to a bundle of 143 (including 33 “bonus” orbs) for $74.99. 
See Jason Venter, Understanding Fire Emblem Heroes: A Beginner’s Guide, POLYGON 
(Feb. 8, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.polygon.com/fire-emblem-heroes-
guide/2017/2/8/14541874/rewards-base-maps-difficulty-battle-dying-summoning-ritual-
teams-merge-arena-heroes-tower-quests. 
 183 See Castillo, supra note 62, at 189–92. 
 184 Id. at 190. 
 185 Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175049 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 
 186 Castillo, supra note 62, at 191. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Kater, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175049, *1. 
 189 Id. at *2. 
 190 See id. at *3. 
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whereby players would trade for gameplay-extension chips, using the 
in-game transfer feature to finalize the transaction after a deal had 
been struck.191 Prior to playing any digital games, the plaintiff 
accepted the terms of use on the casino’s website, which expressly 
“state[d] that virtual chips have no monetary value and cannot be 
exchanged ‘for cash or any other tangible value.’”192 The plaintiff had 
purchased and subsequently lost over $1,000 worth of these 
gameplay chips prior to bringing suit.193 The district court dismissed 
the complaint with prejudice, finding that because the terms of 
service expressly forbade transferring the gameplay-extension chips 
for value, the defendant “[did] not award something of value 
satisfying the requisite prize element, and therefore the game [was] 
not ‘illegal gambling’ under Washington law.”194 The author based 
his determination that loot box contents could not constitute things of 
value partly on this lower court ruling.195 Ultimately, however, the 
appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the 
gameplay-extension chips were, in fact, a “thing of value,” and 
concluding “that Big Fish Casino falls within Washington’s definition 
of an illegal gambling game.”196 The author’s argument as based 
upon Kater is therefore unconvincing. 
With regard to real-world trading bans under a game’s terms 
of service, the decision on the part of some game developers to 
forbid real-world trading of accounts (and therefore the items 
associated with them) does not necessarily eliminate the  
real-world monetary value of those items to the players holding 
them. A player with no intention of selling their account can still 
be enticed by an attractive advertised item into purchasing a loot 
box in the hopes of acquiring the item. Their inability to 
(lawfully) trade that item does not negate that item’s value to the 
player, which could very well constitute a “prize” sufficient to 
meet most definitions of gambling. Furthermore, the author did 
not acknowledge the existence of authorized online marketplaces, 
such as Steam, where players are free to trade items with other 
players for real-world money and in full compliance with a 
game’s terms of service. For these reasons, this prong of the 
author’s analysis is not convincing. 
In the second prong, the author cited the case of  
Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox International197 to further support his 
 
 191 Id. 
 192 Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., 886 F.3d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 2018) (appellate court 
ruling reversing district court opinion). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175049, *12. 
 195 See Castillo, supra note 62, at 192. 
 196 Kater, 886 F.3d at 788. 
 197 Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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view that U.S. courts would fail to find prize value in a loot box’s 
contents.198 Chaset concerned a Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) suit by “purchasers of 
[physical] trading cards” against the manufacturers of those 
cards, who distributed them at random in manufacturer-sealed 
booster packs.199 At issue was the disappointment consumers felt 
in failing to obtain desirable “chase” cards, and whether that 
disappointment rose to the level of an injury to property.200 The 
Ninth Circuit in Chaset dismissed the case for lack of standing, 
noting that the plaintiffs lacked an injury to property.201 In 
pertinent part, the Ninth Circuit wrote: 
At the time the plaintiffs purchased the package of cards, which is the 
time the value of the package should be determined, they received 
value—eight or ten cards, one of which might be an insert card—for 
what they paid as a purchase price. Their disappointment upon not 
finding an insert card in the package is not an injury to property.202 
In coming to this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit appears to 
indicate not that the contents of a pack of cards themselves are 
worthless, but rather that they have a set value as a sealed pack, 
calculated at the time of purchase and not when its contents are 
discovered.203 
Industry advocates have trotted out the comparison to 
physical trading cards often in defense of loot box practices.204 
The argument is clear: if trading card packs under Chaset have a 
value as a pack with a certain number of cards inside, and 
nothing more, then loot boxes, which have a value as a loot box 
with a certain number of items inside, likely have no further 
value. A consumer’s expectations are not subverted when they 
open the loot box and fail to find the item they desired, or so the 
argument might go. But this argument fails to distinguish 
physical trading cards under Chaset from the contents of loot 
boxes, which differ in significant respects. 
For one, the cause of action in Chaset was a RICO claim,205 
not an attempt to label trading cards as a form of gambling. The 
 
 198 Castillo, supra note 62, at 189. 
 199 Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1085. 
 200 Id. at 1087. 
 201 Id. at 1087–88. 
 202 Id. at 1087. 
 203 See id. 
 204 See, e.g., INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 42 (ESA representative Mike 
Warnecke claiming, “For 75 years or more, Americans have been opening up millions of 
packages of baseball cards to put together their dream team, to get the players that they 
root for on their home teams, and to build their collections with their friends. It ’s a 
common mechanic that people are very familiar with.”). 
 205 Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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requirement of an injury to property is an element of a RICO 
claim,206 not of a traditional gambling definition. Further, the 
trading card comparison is inapposite because it fails to take into 
account the velocity with which consumers can participate in loot 
box transactions.207 At the 2019 FTC conference, Professor Adam 
Elmachtoub explained in response to a question about the 
trading card comparison: 
[O]ne thing though it’s important to recognize, is there’s no friction 
costs for buying loot boxes. There’s a huge friction cost for buying a 
physical item. . . . So when you buy something—even if you buy it 
from Amazon, you still have to wait to receive it. And by that point, 
your thrill may have disappeared a little bit.208 
Noted researcher Dr. David Zendle, at that same conference, 
responded to Professor Elmachtoub by noting: 
I remember when we were talking to the Australian Senate about 
this, they sort of said, what are the differences between loot boxes and 
trading card games in the real world. . . . [O]ne of the things that 
seems important is the velocity and the volume with which you can 
make loot box purchases. I mean, you can’t go to a shop and just buy 
Kinder Egg, Kinder Egg, Kinder Egg, Kinder Egg, Kinder Egg, Kinder 
Egg, Kinder Egg, Kinder Egg, but that’s what we see people do with 
loot boxes.209 
The above discussion between Professor Elmachtoub and  
Dr. Zendle draws into sharp contrast the distinction between 
physical card purchases and digital loot box buys. Whereas 
physical purchases involve “friction costs,” such as taking an 
item to the cash register or waiting for it to be delivered (which 
represent opportunities for individuals to rethink their purchase 
or, more significantly, subsequent purchases), loot boxes can be 
purchased very quickly using pre-recorded credit card 
information,210 large bundles,211 and even in the case of the 
Google Play Store, biometrics in the form of one-touch fingerprint 
purchase authorization.212 Academics have noted that, 
particularly in the realm of smart phone gaming, app designers 
 
 206 18 U.S.C.S. § 1964(c) (2000). 
 207 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note, at 159–60. 
 208 Id. at 159. 
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prioritize developing experiences that short-circuit individuals’ 
ability to control their own impulses.213 
This cuts against the possible moralistic argument that only 
gamblers are hurt by sharp practices in the realm of digital 
monetization; apps are increasingly being designed to exploit 
fundamental weaknesses of human psychology.214 For these 
reasons, it is not appropriate to claim that the purchaser of a loot 
box is in as strong a position to evaluate the value of what they 
are purchasing as is the purchaser of a physical product; the 
transaction far better resembles a digital game of chance than 
the simple purchase of a product. A finder of fact could take the 
next logical step and hold that loot box contents (whether 
transferable or not) have value. 
C. Consideration 
Another argument against the classification of loot boxes as 
a form of gambling is the purported absence of consideration in 
the transaction.215 This argument is not as strong as the 
argument against the existence of a valuable prize, however, 
because loot boxes are by definition available for direct purchase 
using a real-life payment method.216 Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “consideration” as “[s]omething (such as an act, a 
forbearance, or a return promise) bargained for and received by a 
promisor from a promise; that which motivates a person to do 
something, esp. to engage in a legal act.”217 Consideration is an 
essential element in all contracts.218 
As Industry advocates themselves are quick to point out, 
players are not required to buy loot boxes to play games.219 As 
such, any money a player pays in exchange for a loot box is 
consideration for a single transaction, separate from the 
purchase price of the game, if any.220 For this reason, it is clear 
that players are paying consideration in exchange for loot boxes, 
regardless of the determination of whether individual items have 
value or whether there is chance involved. 
 
 213 See Langvardt, supra note 89, at 141–42. 
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One author asserted that because certain titles, such as 
Overwatch and Star Wars Battlefront II, made all their in-game 
items available “after a certain amount of time playing,” a  
would-be plaintiff would be hard-pressed to argue that they had 
risked their money on a loot box.221 This argument fails to 
account for games in which loot box items are only available 
through loot boxes, and cannot be received through 
commensurate in-game play. Furthermore, even if items are 
capable of being unlocked outside of a loot box, a player is still 
paying consideration when they purchase a loot box hoping to 
receive particular items immediately by random chance. The 
opportunity to earn an in-game item outside of a loot box based 
upon a large time investment does not diminish the cash value of 
the consideration a player pays in exchange for a loot box. 
Finally, as another author noted, “California courts have held 
that consideration need not be paid solely for the chance to win 
[in a gambling scheme]; rather, it is enough that consideration is 
paid for something in addition to the chance to win a prize.”222 
That author reasoned that consideration’s value is not 
diminished by the guaranteed receipt of a random item from a 
loot box.223 
Another author raised an important note, reasoning that, 
although a tech-savvy fact-finder might accept that loot boxes 
meet the requisite elements of gambling, most cases would be 
dismissed nevertheless on the grounds that plaintiffs lack a 
particularized injury sufficient to constitute standing.224 From 
that author’s perspective, loot boxes will only be treated as 
gambling activity by courts when there has been “unequivocal 
legislation to categorize them as such.”225 However, the objective 
of this Article is not to claim that individual plaintiffs should be 
able to recover their lost consideration on a case-by-case basis 
(which would require those plaintiffs’ cases to survive motions to 
dismiss for lack of standing). Rather, this section has attempted 
to demonstrate that loot boxes are, in every meaningful sense, a 
form of gambling, such that game developers should be required 
to prospectively comply with existing gambling regulations.226 
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Even if loot boxes are ultimately held to not constitute a 
form of gambling, they remain susceptible to novel forms of 
regulation. One possible regulatory avenue could be direct FTC 
oversight over loot boxes and other microtransactions, even if it 
is settled that they do not constitute gambling.227 Alternatively, 
Congress or any given state could pass sweeping limitations or 
outright bans to curb the practice.228 Neither of these possible 
regulatory solutions require a court to hold that loot boxes 
constitute a form of gambling under existing law. Despite the 
fierce public-relations battle that is still raging over the gambling 
determination, its disposition is not the end of the discussion. 
IV. CURRENT REGULATORY MEASURES UNDER INDUSTRY SELF-
REGULATION 
At present, loot boxes are entirely unregulated by any 
federal or state statute in the United States.229 In evaluating the 
current state (or lack thereof) of loot box regulation, two authors 
for the National Law Review commented, “Several states, 
including Hawaii, Washington, California, and Minnesota, also 
introduced bills last year to regulate the use of loot boxes in 
games, but all failed to pass.”230 This failure was not for a lack of 
interest on the part of the legislators behind the respective bills; 
Rep. Chris Lee of the Hawaii House of Representatives publicly 
condemned the practice in introducing his state’s ultimately 
doomed legislation, calling loot boxes “a trap” that has “compelled 
many folks to spend thousands of dollars in gaming fees 
online.”231 Vulnerable individuals are not the only ones falling 
prey to the practice; Rep. Lee himself shared his personal 
experience with the creeping cost of loot boxes while playing 
Clash of Clans during his downtime, stating, “At one point, I 
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started buying crystals. I ended up spending a few hundred 
dollars over the course of a few months.”232 He reflected that, 
upon realizing what had happened and deleting the app, “there 
was no value left. It’s just money that’s gone.”233 
At the federal level, Senator Margaret Hassan of New 
Hampshire, in responding to her constituents’ concerns, 
corresponded directly with the president of the ESRB, Patricia 
Vance, asking the Industry to adopt improved loot box 
disclosures and to “develop best practices for developers.”234 
Senator Hassan further pressed the FTC to look into the practice, 
questioning nominees on their stance on the dangers posed by 
loot boxes.235 The August 2019 FTC conference discussed above 
was likely the direct result of Senator Hassan’s outreach.236 
On the legislative front, one bill introduced in 2019 would 
ban loot boxes in games directed primarily toward minors.237 The 
practice would prohibit defined “pay-to-win microtransactions 
and sales of loot boxes in minor-oriented games,”238 and would 
further prohibit the “publication or distribution of video games 
containing pay-to-win microtransactions or purchasing loot boxes 
where the publisher or distributor has constructive knowledge 
that any users are under age 18.”239 However, the bill has yet to 
advance, and some commentators have expressed concerns about 
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its potential overbreadth,240 while others have mocked its 
chances of passage altogether.241 
The ESRB, and by extension its parent entity the ESA, are 
the only entities to have enacted anything resembling loot box 
regulations.242 The Industry’s advocates frequently argue that 
sufficient controls are already in place, and that parents need 
only be educated about the tools the Industry has placed within 
their control.243 In response to Senator Hassan’s communications 
with the FTC, and the subsequent announcement that the FTC 
would be hosting an exploratory panel in August 2019, ESA 
president Stanley Pierre-Louis noted, “We look forward to 
sharing with the senator the tools and information the industry 
already provides that keeps the control of in-game spending in 
parents’ hands. . . . Parents already have the ability to limit or 
prohibit in-game purchases with easy to use parental controls.”244 
Such arguments imply that no further regulation is necessary, 
only education.245 
Despite purporting to engage in self-regulation, the 
Industry’s advocates and representatives frequently disregard 
suggested regulatory changes by relying on their blanket 
assertion that loot boxes are not gambling.246 At the 2019 FTC 
workshop, an audience question about whether the Industry 
would seek to connect affected players with resources similar to 
Gamblers’ Anonymous was met with the following response from 
panelist Mike Warnecke of the ESA: “So, no, it does not include 
any sort of hotline for that. ESA’s position is that loot boxes are 
not a form of gambling and that it wouldn’t be an appropriate 
solution to that issue.”247 
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It was not until the FTC workshop was underway that the 
ESRB announced that it would seek to compel its member 
entities to disclose loot box drop rates to players.248 Although the 
ESRB did not impose a detailed timetable for compliance,249 
multiple panelists in attendance touted the measure as a 
significant act of self-regulation.250 However, commentators have 
noted that heralding the measure as an act of self-regulation is 
somewhat disingenuous,251 as the measure was announced only 
after China had already enacted laws mandating such disclosure 
within their markets.252 Furthermore, the exact method and 
specificity of odds disclosures under the mandate are unclear, 
with no set standard.253 Absent a rigorous and well-defined odds 
disclosure scheme, players will not be meaningfully informed of 
the odds against them.254 Further, even if the Industry 
committed to a measurable standard for disclosure, at present 
enforcement would be entirely managed by Industry insiders.255 
Keith S. White, executive director of the National Council on 
Problem Gambling, stated at the FTC workshop: 
And one of the things that we do a lot in the gambling industry, is we 
recognize the role of parents, we recognize the role of industry self-
verification, but we absolutely believe that there has to be third-party 
objective regulation. Sometimes that could take the role of the— 
sometimes that could be the role of the FTC. . . . It’s an important 
consumer protection feature. And so if the industry is going to provide 
us information on odds and randomness, take a lesson from the 
gambling side, you got to get it done independently. It’s not going to be 
effective if you’re just telling us, oh, trust me, this game, these items 
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drop at this rate, especially without any means to independently 
verify it.256 
Perhaps the only concrete regulation the ESRB has 
promulgated in this area has been the requirement of an  
“In-Game Purchases” label on games featuring loot boxes, among 
other microtransactions.257 However, when initially released in 
2018, the label did not distinguish between loot boxes and other, 
less-controversial microtransactions in games, such as one-time 
purchases of non-randomized content.258 The words “loot box” do 
not appear on any ESRB ratings packaging259; it is necessary to 
review the ESRB’s website to find loot boxes listed and defined, 
amongst a wider list defining other types of microtransactions 
such as “In-Game Currency” and “Expansions.”260 Prior to early 
April, 2020, the “In-Game Purchases” label said nothing more.261 
Perhaps in direct response to criticisms similar to those outlined 
above, on April 13, 2020 the ESRB updated the In-Game 
Purchases label to read on relevant titles, “In-Game Purchases 
(Includes Random Items).”262 The ESRB noted that this new 
measure was intended “[t]o provide even greater transparency 
about the nature of in-game items available for purchase . . . .”263 
Outlining how the new label would be implemented, the ESRB 
explained: 
This new Interactive Element, In-Game Purchases (Includes Random 
Items), will be assigned to any game that contains in-game offers to 
purchase digital goods or premiums with real world currency (or with 
virtual coins or other forms of in-game currency that can be purchased 
with real world currency) for which the player doesn’t know prior to 
purchase the specific digital goods or premiums they will be receiving 
(e.g., loot boxes, item packs, mystery awards). In-Game Purchases 
(Includes Random Items) will be assigned to all games that include 
purchases with any randomized elements, including loot boxes, gacha 
games, item or card packs, prize wheels, treasure chests, and more.264 
The article released by the ESRB announcing this new 
change justified the prior exclusion of the element of 
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randomization from the label by noting, “According to research, 
parents are far more concerned about their child’s ability to 
spend real money in games than the fact that those in-game 
purchases may be randomized.”265 The ESRB claimed that the 
updated label, explicitly acknowledging randomization, resulted 
because of outreach from “many game consumers and 
enthusiasts (not necessarily parents) . . . asking the ESRB to 
include additional information to identify games that include 
randomized purchases.”266 Perhaps anticipating further criticism, 
the ESRB directly acknowledged the lack of the term “loot box,” 
anywhere in the revised literature.267 It justified the exclusion by 
observing that “‘Loot box’ is a term that doesn’t encompass all 
types of randomized in-game purchase mechanics. We want to 
ensure that the new label covers all transactions with 
randomized elements.”268 It further noted: 
Moreover, we want to avoid confusing consumers who may not be 
familiar with what a loot box is. Recent research shows that less than 
a third of parents have both heard of a loot box and know what it is. 
“Loot box” is a widely understood phrase in and around the video 
game industry and among dedicated gamers, but most people less 
familiar with games do not understand it. While this new label is 
primarily in response to feedback from game enthusiasts, it is still 
essential that all consumers, especially parents, have a clear 
understanding of the rating information we provide.269 
Based on the foregoing, it appears the ESRB prioritizes 
cleanliness and brevity over meaningful information when crafting 
on-box video game ratings—further clarification risks raising 
uninformed consumers’ concerns. The fact that the ESRB has 
updated the label at all suggests that it sees the need to take some 
nominal action to respond to increased consumer concerns about loot 
box implementation, despite the ESRB’s refusal to directly 
acknowledge the practice’s similarities to traditional gambling 
activity. 
Apart from the Industry’s commitment to a mercurial and future 
standard for loot box odds disclosure, and the (newly-updated)  
In-Game Purchases label, nothing further is required of game 
developers by the ESRB with regard to loot box implementation. If 
this is to be the regulatory standard of the Industry’s appointed  
self-regulator, it is helpful to analyze the arguments for and against 
such self-regulation. 
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V. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION 
The Industry’s struggle for self-regulation was hard-won. 
Public outrage had been building against the Industry in the 
early 1990s,270 as concerned parents turned their attention from 
explicit music to explicit video game content.271 In particular, a 
street-fighting game called Mortal Kombat and a Sega game 
entitled Night Trap raised concerns about the effects of violent 
and sexual content in these games on video game-playing 
minors.272 Senators Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut and 
Herbert Kohl of Wisconsin brought the issue to the attention of 
Congress, and held contentious hearings where the publishers of 
these titles were forced to justify the publication of these 
games.273 Senator Lieberman introduced the Video Game Rating 
Act of 1994, which threatened to unilaterally establish an 
Interactive Entertainment Rating Commission.274 Senator 
Lieberman’s purpose in introducing the Act was to show the 
government’s hand and encourage the Industry to take 
responsibility for its own regulation instead.275 Senator 
Lieberman directly warned the Industry to that effect during one 
such hearing, advising, “The best thing you can do, not only for 
this country, but for yourselves, is to self-regulate. And believe 
me, it’s not only going to be important to our kids, it’s going to be 
important to the ultimate credibility and success of your 
business.”276 
As a direct result of sustained public and political pressure, 
and with the sword of the Video Game Rating Act dangling 
overhead,277 the ESA (then called the Interactive Digital 
Software Association) founded the ESRB in 1994.278 The ESRB 
developed a three-part rating system, with multiple content 
descriptors, “after consulting a wide range of child development 
and academic experts, analyzing other rating systems, and 
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conducting nationwide research with parents.”279 ESRB content 
rating is voluntary for game developers,280 although all major 
console manufacturers281 and multiple big-box stores282 require 
affiliated games to go through the rating process. 
The ESRB has developed standardized ratings and 
enforcement guidelines for all its member entities’ video 
games.283 Senator Lieberman has since hailed the ratings entity, 
claiming, “I have long said that the ESRB ratings are the most 
comprehensive in the media industry. There are many  
age-appropriate games that are clever and entertaining. Parents 
should understand and use the ratings to help them decide which 
video games to buy for their families.”284 Authors have applauded 
the success of the ESRB’s regulatory oversight in working to 
inform parents and consumers generally of the content of video 
games.285 
Long having been the target of calls for “politically-opportune 
overregulation,”286 the Industry is perhaps rightly fearful of the 
imposition of government oversight.287 One of the strongest 
arguments for Industry self-regulation is that it wards off 
government censorship.288 At the 2019 FTC workshop, Renee Gittins 
of the International Game Developers Association shared the 
perspectives of two of her fellow game developers, one supportive of 
regulation, the other opposed.289 The opposing perspective provided, 
“I do not think it is the government’s role to regulate. It should be the 
industry and consumers that do. It could be a slippery slope that 
could lead to game censorship since the gaming industry has and will 
always be an easy scapegoat.”290 Ms. Gittins emphasized the 
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Industry’s concerns about possible creative restrictions outside 
regulation could impose, adding that “game developers are worried 
about heavy-handed regulation hurting the game industry and their 
creativity.”291 
The video game industry’s self-regulatory body has been 
favorably compared to the Motion Picture Association of America 
(“MPAA”) with regard to its ability to preserve the First 
Amendment rights of the Industry.292 The MPAA (originally the 
Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, or 
MPPDA) “was established in 1922 by the major Hollywood 
production studios in response to increasing government 
censorship of films, which arose in turn from a general public 
outcry against both indecency on the screen and various scandals 
involving motion-picture celebrities.”293 The Agency enabled 
Hollywood to censor itself and stave off mounting calls for 
government intervention to police morality in films.294 The 
Agency’s website notes, “Since that time, the MPA has served as 
the voice and advocate of the film and television industry around 
the world, advancing the business and art of storytelling, 
protecting the creative and artistic freedoms of storytellers, and 
bringing entertainment and inspiration to audiences 
worldwide.”295 
However, comparisons of the ESRB to the MPAA are 
fundamentally flawed. Loot box criticisms have everything to do 
with the monetization of video games; they have nothing to do 
with the content of video games.296 Hypothetically, two nearly 
identical games could be released, with the same title, 
characters, plot, and gameplay. One version of the game would 
not feature loot boxes and would have all of its content freely 
available upon purchase of the full game. The other version of the 
game would include loot boxes, with certain in-game items and 
effects gated behind the mechanism. Only the second game would 
run afoul of the criticisms levelled against loot boxes. The 
creative and expressive content of a video game has nothing to do 
with loot box functionality; it is how that content is parceled-out 
and subdivided by loot boxes that raises consumer concerns. It is 
disingenuous to claim that the government would be regulating 
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the speech or content of a video game by regulating how loot 
boxes are implemented; the government would only be regulating 
how that game was monetized. 
Furthermore, the external regulation of loot boxes would not 
render the ESRB moot. The ESRB continues to perform its 
function, and it performs it well: rating the content of video 
games to keep consumers informed.297 As one author pointed out, 
“Senator Hassan is correct in noting that further research on 
monetization mechanics is necessary to guide regulatory efforts. 
But the ESRB is not best-equipped to handle such a task. The 
ESRB’s function is to review gaming content for such features as 
age-appropriateness, violence, graphic language, and nudity.”298 
Based on that logic, the ESRB is arguably overstepping its 
authority by inserting itself into the gambling determination. 
The manner in which a game is monetized is simply not a 
creative concern, and government oversight of monetization 
would pose no credible danger of censorship. 
However, not all who agree that the ESRB should recuse 
itself from the regulation of loot boxes agree as to the appropriate 
next step. That same author went on to argue, “Instead of 
expanding the ESRB’s role, the industry should have a separate 
self-regulatory organization whose sole purpose is to investigate 
deceptive monetization techniques, publish guidelines, and 
enforce compliance.”299 But such a step would only be a  
half-measure; the newly-formed Industry entity would be just as 
susceptible to Industry influence and suffer from the same 
fundamental conflict of interest to which the ESRB is 
vulnerable.300 Industries’ self-regulation with regard to 
creativity, as is the case with the MPAA, helps to safeguard those 
industries’ First Amendment rights.301 However, allowing the 
Industry to be the sole arbiter of whether its monetization 
methods are fair, ethical, or legal is the height of folly. It is 
critical to note that the ESRB exists to protect the Industry from 
outside regulation, not to protect the public from the Industry.302 
It is the equivalent of leaving the proverbial fox to run the 
henhouse. 
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The Industry has consistently failed to act in good faith with 
regard to consumer concerns about loot boxes.303 Indeed, the 
Industry’s refusal to recognize the negative effects of loot boxes, 
even in the face of mounting evidence, amounts to bad faith 
conduct. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “bad faith” as 
“[d]ishonesty of belief or purpose.”304 The Industry has responded 
to public concerns about the negative psychological effects of loot 
boxes with persistent skepticism305 and condescension306 that 
betrays such a dishonesty of belief. At the FTC workshop, where 
an International Game Developers Association (“IGDA”) 
representative read out both a pro- and anti-regulation 
statement prepared by two of her peers, the pro-regulation 
statement provided, “Unfortunately, it seems that the industry is 
having trouble being ethical when there’s profit to be made. If 
someone cannot be trusted to not exploit someone else, then we 
must place down a regulation to protect others.”307 While the 
IGDA representative repeated the anti-regulation statement “[i]n 
summary,” she did not acknowledge her pro-regulation peer’s 
statement beyond simply reciting it.308 While the IGDA 
spokesperson is only an individual and does not speak for the 
Industry as a whole, her selective deafness speaks to a pattern on 
the part of Industry advocates, a pattern of willfully disregarding 
valid criticisms of the practice of using loot boxes.309 
The ESRB’s decision to add the “(Includes Random Items)” 
label came only after two years of sustained criticism that the 
original label insufficiently notified purchasers of the presence of 
loot boxes—even then, the ESRB minimized consumers’ concerns 
about loot boxes specifically.310 Further, the Industry refuses to 
meaningfully respond to criticism in this area, a practice perhaps 
best illustrated by the frequency with which its advocates refuse 
to engage in a discussion over loot boxes. In one instance, EA’s 
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Vice President of legal and government affairs claimed at a 
hearing of the United Kingdom’s Parliament that Star Wars 
Battlefront II’s randomized purchases were not loot boxes, “but 
rather ‘surprise mechanics.’”311 He further claimed, despite the 
increased economic costs loot boxes impose on players, that 
players actually enjoy the experience, stating, “We do think the 
way that we have implemented these kinds of mechanics . . . is 
actually quite ethical and quite fun, quite enjoyable to people.”312 
By failing to even acknowledge loot boxes as loot boxes, or 
recognize their wild unpopularity amongst players,313 members of 
the Industry have effectively stalled meaningful conversation on 
the subject. When a Reddit user complained about paying a 
purchase price of $80 for Star Wars Battlefront II, only to have 
Darth Vader locked behind a loot box, the EACommunityTeam 
account responded, “The intent is to provide players with a sense 
of pride and accomplishment for unlocking different heroes.”314 
That comment has since gone on to be the most “downvoted” 
(disliked by unique users) post in Reddit’s history,315 with 
667,826 downvotes at the time of writing, suggesting that players 
did not agree with its sentiment.316 One struggles to see how 
asking players to pay additional funds to unlock portions of a 
game they have already purchased would instill “pride” in those 
players; rather, the argument leaves the impression that the 
speaker is not being forthright about its true purpose. These 
incidents illustrate that the Industry is all too willing to engage 
in bad faith argumentation when confronted about its 
monetization practices, disingenuously claiming that the feature 
is somehow beneficial to players.  
The Industry’s repeated insistence that loot boxes are not a 
form of gambling, even in the face of mounting evidence of its 
negative impact on individuals susceptible to gambling-related 
harm, further demonstrates the Industry’s disinterest in 
communicating in good faith. Dr. Zendle and Dr. Cairns arguably 
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put the Industry on notice in 2018, when they wrote, in reporting 
on a large-scale study on the links between loot box purchases 
and problem gambling behavior, “[i]f loot boxes are attractive to 
those with problem gambling behaviours, they pose a serious 
moral question for the games companies who profit from 
them.”317 They noted that the Industry did not seem to accept 
such a negative narrative, writing: 
However, criticism of loot boxes has been roundly rebuffed by 
representatives of the games industry, with the ESRB recently 
claiming that there was insufficient evidence to state that loot boxes 
had negative consequences for gamers. They instead declared that “we 
do not consider loot boxes to be gambling for various reasons . . . loot 
boxes are more comparable to baseball cards, where there is an 
element of surprise and you always get something.”318 
Further evidence of the Industry’s bad faith in failing to 
publicly acknowledge the harmful effects of loot boxes can be 
found in its knowing reliance on revenue derived from 
“whales.”319 While claiming that it cannot control the behavior of 
a small addicted outgroup,320 the Industry simultaneously 
accounts for the majority of its loot box-related profits from that 
same small group.321 If the issue of loot box implementation is a 
“moral question” as Dr. Zendle and Dr. Cairns posited,322 the 
Industry appears to have given its answer. 
As discussed more fully in Section IV, the Industry has 
dragged its proverbial feet on each loot box regulation it has 
reluctantly advanced, each only in response to an outside 
stimulus and only after a significant delay. While entities such as 
the MPAA impose no additional financial burdens on consumers 
in performing their self-regulatory function, the same cannot be 
said of the ESRB, which has turned a blind eye to the negative 
impacts of loot boxes on players. External regulation of the 
Industry’s monetization practices is preferable to the present 
total abdication of authority to the ESRB. 
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VI. SOLUTIONS 
Rather than continue to defer to the ESRB’s authority or 
encourage the Industry to set up a separate self-regulatory entity 
solely tasked with regulating video game monetization 
practices,323 the federal and state governments must step in to fill 
the void. In 1993, Senator Lieberman threw down the gauntlet 
and challenged the Industry to regulate itself or suffer 
government intervention.324 In this critical area, the Industry has 
had every opportunity to meaningfully regulate itself, but has 
instead dragged its feet, advanced bad faith arguments, and 
abdicated its so-called authority. Apps are increasingly designed 
to circumvent individuals’ psychological resistance to parting 
with their money,325 and in-game currencies are obscuring the 
true cumulative costs of loot box purchases.326 Action is required. 
Absent meaningful Industry action, it is unsurprising that 
consumers have turned to their governments. Whether the FTC 
takes regulatory action in response to the findings of its 2019 
workshop, or state governments successfully pass bills of the sort 
advanced by Rep. Lee of Hawaii,327 either result will likely cause 
a sea change in the Industry with regard to loot boxes. 
A. Regulation by the Federal Trade Commission 
The Federal Trade Commission seeks to promote competition 
and protect consumers through its regulation and enforcement 
mechanisms.328 The FTC’s mission statement with regard to 
consumer protection provides in part that it seeks to prevent 
“unfair” and “deceptive” business practices.329 As illustrated in 
Sections III and V above, loot boxes constitute unfair and 
deceptive practices and are thus ripe for FTC regulation. If the 
moral panics of the 1990s were sufficient to galvanize public 
support for government censorship of video game creative 
content, and stir the Industry to meaningful action, then the 
moral justification for government intervention here is even 
stronger. Before, public outrage concerned only scandalous and 
violent video game content, neither of which were proven to have 
lasting effects on players.330 Here, however, individuals are 
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suffering lasting economic, social, and psychological costs as a 
result of loot box implementation.331 
Initial investigatory steps have already been taken.332 One 
year after the August 2019 FTC Workshop, the agency issued a 
“staff perspective” report.333 The report reviewed the issues 
submitted to the FTC at the workshop and through public 
comment, distilling the key concerns of panelists and commenters 
to the following points: (1) mechanics that may confuse or 
manipulate consumers; (2) users feeling pressure to spend; (3) the 
impact of the practice on children; (4) the manner in which loot 
box odds are disclosed; (5) issues concerning in-game purchase 
disclosures (i.e. in-game currency confusion); and (6) concerns 
regarding whether developers could give popular content creators 
loot boxes with better odds for “promotional purposes than odds 
available to the general public.”334 While the FTC staff 
perspective report provided an overview of possible future 
regulatory measures, it emphasized the role of existing ESRB 
initiatives such as the new “Includes Random Items” label, as 
well as “other proposed self-regulatory measures.”335 To the 
extent the staff perspective discussed dissenting views critical of 
the ESRB, it merely included a section entitled “Mixed views on 
increased government regulation.”336 The section briefly touched 
on the idea of implementing “third-party, independent 
verification of loot box odds” and hoping for “greater industry 
transparency.”337 A significant portion of this section was devoted 
to reiterating the Industry’s scaremongering that “poorly crafted 
regulation could harm the industry and inadequately protect 
consumers.”338 The document emphasized the importance of 
conducting further research in this “evolving” area, highlighting 
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the suggestions of “some panelists” who “encouraged the industry 
to share relevant video game data with researchers.”339 The 
document’s conclusion, while noting the increased relevance of 
the loot box discussion in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
corresponding increased video game usage, made no 
recommendations as to how to proceed.340 Rather, the FTC’s staff 
stated merely that it “encourages [the] industry to continue 
efforts to provide clear and meaningful information to consumers 
about in-game loot box and related microtransactions.”341 The 
FTC did vanishingly little to suggest any direct action on its own 
part, only noting that it would “continue to monitor developments 
surrounding loot boxes and take appropriate steps to prevent 
unfair or deceptive practices.”342 
In merely reciting the criticisms of the Industry’s behavior, 
some of which suggest the Industry harbors improper motives in 
pursuing this monetization method,343 while simultaneously 
deferring to the Industry’s present self-regulatory measures, the 
FTC has signaled its disinterest in stepping into the arena at the 
present time. For reasons discussed throughout this article, this 
approach is insufficient to protect consumers. It is not sufficient 
to allow the Industry to continue to profit through these practices 
when the FTC has acknowledged the problematic nature of loot 
box odds disclosures and in-game currencies at present. A tepid 
commitment to mandate some form of permanent disclosure 
schedule, written by the Industry itself, at some point in the 
future does nothing to protect consumers today, and little to 
protect them tomorrow. Because of the FTC’s deference toward 
the Industry at this point in time, consumers should look 
elsewhere for protection. 
B. Regulation by State Governments 
Individual state regulations may be best suited to rein in the 
Industry. While a single regulatory body is vulnerable to regulatory 
capture,344 a robust and varied patchwork of state laws would 
require the Industry to meaningfully respond or else cease to 
operate in each jurisdiction entirely. While the Industry has 
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previously pulled entire games out of countries such as Belgium in 
response to those countries’ consumer protection laws,345 such 
action would likely not be economically viable for the Industry if 
such a large global economy as California enacted meaningful loot 
box regulations. For a prime example of a state’s power to compel 
better behavior on the part of its corporate citizens, look no further 
than the California Appellate Court’s position that gig economy 
ride-share companies must treat their drivers as employees, rather 
than as independent contractors.346 Even where companies threaten 
to pull out of a state entirely,347 such a result nevertheless 
vindicates the right of the state to define what practices it will and 
will not accept within its borders. 
Regulation of loot boxes should be no different. States can, in 
response to the popular will of their residents, begin to restrict 
the practice of operating a loot box scheme by passing meaningful 
regulations on a state-by-state basis. States may define which 
loot box practices they will accept, and which they will not.348 
State regulation would also be more effective at striking the 
correct balance between the interests of consumers and the 
Industry, because each state can experiment with varying types and 
degrees of regulatory control over loot boxes. Rather than face a 
nationwide ban or potentially overbroad and burdensome federal 
regulation, the Industry would instead be subjected to individual 
states’ efforts to formulate the “best” form of regulation. The 
Supreme Court has “long recognized the role of the States as 
laboratories for devising solutions to difficult legal problems.”349 
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Leaving regulation of loot boxes to the states would serve that 
purpose well. 
For example, as the 2019 FTC conference demonstrated, 
there is not yet a consensus as to how best to define and police 
loot box odds disclosures, or the precise risks they pose.350 As a 
result, each state’s legislature could decide how best to define the 
manner of disclosure it would require, and how those odds would 
be verified. Different standards could emerge, and the merits of 
each could be directly compared. Each state’s efforts would better 
inform the others, and over time a reasonable and comprehensive 
regulatory system would emerge. When new and uncertain areas 
of the law emerge and the best solution is unclear, consumers are 
well-served by leaving regulation to the states.351 
As a practical matter, interested consumers may have an 
easier time petitioning their respective states for some form of 
regulatory oversight, since they do not need to receive the 
consent of legislators from the other states, as would be required 
if a federal statute was to be passed. For the reasons asserted 
above, the best method of achieving meaningful regulation of the 
Industry would be through state-by-state regulation. 
C. Suggested Forms of Regulation 
Whether the federal or state governments take the regulatory 
lead, regulators should consider government-set odds-disclosure 
requirements and limit-setting. 
1. Odds Disclosures 
As discussed in Section IV, the Industry touted its 
commitment to mandate loot box odds disclosures by the end of 
2020.352 But the exact Industry standards for odds disclosure 
remain mercurial, and are unlikely to meaningfully advise 
consumers.353 Additional problems arise when considering 
dynamic odds loot boxes, where the odds of receiving the item 
varies, because it greatly complicates the ability to determine 
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whether the Industry is adhering to its published odds.354 Even 
when the ESRB imposes mandatory odds-disclosure 
requirements on all its members, no two games are likely to use 
the same loot box system, which will make use of a centralized 
and easy-to-understand odds disclosure schedule difficult. 
Further, the Industry has a vested interest in only complying 
with these disclosure requirements at the bare minimum, in the 
most obtuse possible way.355 In short, two problems are currently 
posed by the self-regulation initiative as it concerns odds 
disclosures: (1) it does not reasonably assure consumers that they 
will be meaningfully informed of the odds against them; and (2) it 
leaves the Industry to police its own adherence to its standards, 
with no mechanism for consumer or government oversight. 
Government intervention would resolve both issues. A 
government-set odds disclosure schedule could provide 
uniformity across different games and mandate transparency, 
rather than leaving each developer to live up to the ESRB’s odds 
disclosure commitment on a case-by-case basis. As demonstrated 
in gambling regulation, “self-regulation alone is never enough. It 
must have an enforceable consumer protection framework and be 
accompanied by external oversight, research, monitoring, and 
verification by independent groups.”356 So too would meaningful 
loot box regulation rely upon external verification of the 
Industry’s compliance. Whereas a dissatisfied consumer 
currently has little power to review the fairness of the behind-
the-scenes operations of her favorite mobile game, regulatory 
officials would be empowered to do so. 
Further, a standardized method of odds disclosures would 
prevent the Industry from developing novel and confusing payout 
structures intended only to further obscure players’ chances. If all 
games had to comply with a certain pre-set form of odds-disclosure, 
new loot boxes could not be developed that would employ inherently 
confusing probabilities for their own sake. Rather than try to cloud 
the odds, developers could cultivate player engagement with them by 
openly and ethically drawing their attention to them. As suggested 
by Mr. Whyte at the FTC workshop: “[L]et’s find a way to make this 
information in disclosures entertaining and interactive and exciting. 
 
 354 See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 163 (statement of Adam Elmachtoub) (“So I 
think that with regard to dynamic odds, I think that would be a nightmare to regulate. 
Because as the odds are changing, you can never, with like just a couple samples, see if 
you’re truly adhering to such odds.”). 
 355 See id. at 190 (statement of Keith Whyte) (“I would hate to see [odds disclosure 
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You know, build it into gameplay. Reward players for doing some 
pro-social behavior, like finding out what really the odds are in this 
game.”357 The Industry has the ability to better inform its players, 
and from a financial perspective, has no incentive to do so currently. 
Government-set and monitored odds-disclosures would remove the 
tension between ethical and economic considerations in this area. 
2. Limit-Setting 
Another practice that could assist users in making informed 
purchase decisions is the requirement of pre-commitment  
limit-setting.358 Dr. Aaron Drummond wrote to the journal Addiction 
on the topic of loot boxes in a letter to the editor, in which he provided 
a brief overview of the controversy and expressed his concerns about 
the practice’s similarities to gambling activity.359 He cited Dr. Zendle 
and Dr. Cairns’s study, which indicated that problem gamblers spent 
approximately $25 USD per month on loot boxes, compared to non-
problem gamblers, who spent approximately $2.50 USD in the same 
time period.360 Noting the parallels between loot box spending and 
problem gambling behavior, Dr. Drummond advanced pre-
commitment limit-setting as a possible solution, one he described as a 
“largely overlooked regulatory control.”361 Dr. Drummond detailed 
the limit-setting process as follows: 
In electronic gambling, pre-commitment limit-setting involves users 
specifying (voluntarily or compulsorily), before engaging in gambling, 
the maximum they would like to spend. Once reached, this limit 
triggers a reminder message and a cooling-off period in which the 
player is unable to gamble further. Limit setting is broadly effective at 
reducing over-expenditure, and generally viewed positively by 
gamblers. Our reanalysis suggests a clear need for limit-setting 
mechanisms on loot boxes, because a substantial proportion (30%) of 
the highest spenders are moderate-high-risk gamblers. Further 
increasing the probable utility of limit-setting in this context, unlike 
traditional gambling platforms gamers cannot bypass the limit-setting 
restriction simply by switching to a different game—rewards are 
game-specific.362 
Dr. Drummond suggested a price point of $50 USD per month as 
a recommended limit-setting threshold, noting that beyond that point 
“the proportion of risky gamblers rises substantially . . . , implying 
that this may be a functional spending cap to minimize over-
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spending by at-risk populations.”363 He also discussed the option of 
absolute limits on loot box spending as an alternative explored by 
other researchers.364 Directly calling upon regulators, Dr. Drummond 
concluded, “Policymakers would be wise to consider pre-commitment 
limit-setting and other harm minimization controls used in 
traditional gambling to regulate loot box spending.”365 
Individuals with experience regulating gambling, such as 
Keith Whyte of the National Council on Problem Gambling, have 
spoken out in support of similar practices.366 At the 2019 FTC 
workshop, Mr. Whyte noted: 
[A]nother tip from the gambling side is self-exclusion. So one of the 
most effective ways to help someone who may have a problem with 
their gambling, or with their gaming use, is to allow them to self-
exclude themselves. And in an environment where transactions are 
monitored, you can use self-exclusion through payment mechanisms, 
because while people may have many different accounts and play 
many different games across many different providers and platforms, 
they’re probably using that one credit card, or at least a common bank 
account. And so payment level blocking can be very effective, 
buttressing and adding to existing platform level controls and others.  
 Self-exclusion also places a priority, or that places the emphasis on 
the gambler, or the gamer, and not necessarily the operator.367 
Not all experts agree that limit-setting would be an effective 
solution. In a subsequent letter to the editor of Addiction, Doctors 
Daniel L. King and Paul H. Delfabbro critiqued Dr. Drummond’s 
recommendation that limit-setting be incorporated into loot box 
regulations.368 They noted: 
Drummond et al. assert that limit‐setting ‘is broadly effective at 
reducing over‐expenditure, and generally viewed positively by 
gamblers’. While we agree that a range of harm minimization controls 
should be examined, we have some reservations about proposing any 
single regulatory control in isolation of other supporting measures. 
Introducing a $50 limit on loot box spending, as Drummond et al. 
propose, may have unintended consequences that lead to other 
problems (e.g. some players may increase their playing time to 
compensate for spending less money). Additionally, game designers 
may find strategies to obtain revenue in other ways by introducing 
other micro‐transaction features, such as features on external or 
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third‐party platforms, which would create further complexities for 
limit‐setting and players keeping track of spending.369 
The authors did not discard limit-setting as a regulatory 
measure; rather, they cautioned against over-reliance on a single 
regulatory mechanism and instead recommended “undertak[ing] a 
wide consultation and scoping process to develop a comprehensive 
list of potential countermeasures and related consumer advice and 
protections, particularly those designed specifically for gaming and 
in-game purchasing, for the purpose of further review and 
evaluation.”370 While they raise a valid point, the existence of other 
possible consumer protection mechanisms should not foreclose the 
exploration of limit-setting in the here and now. Individuals are 
suffering real harm in the present; waiting to implement protections 
until the best protection has been discovered will needlessly prolong 
their harm. The authors’ concerns are further mitigated in light of 
this Article’s recommendation that the states implement their own 
regulations. By virtue of state-by-state experimentation, the best 
methodology will be discovered in time, and consumer interests will 
be advanced (even if only imperfectly) in the interim. 
From a philosophical perspective, some might object to placing 
limits upon an individuals’ autonomy by preventing them from 
making a purchase they desire to make. In evaluating self-limitation 
as a method of protecting the elderly from predatory lenders, 
Professor Kurt Eggert engaged in an analysis of the meaning of 
autonomy.371 Professor Eggert noted, “If we hold that autonomy has 
intrinsic value, then to improve the lives of the elderly, we should try 
to increase their autonomy.”372 He further discussed the difficulties in 
maximizing elders’ autonomy, writing: 
Increasing autonomy is not merely a matter of removing restraints, 
for even unrestrained, a person may have so few options that she has 
no real choice in what to do. Nor does merely providing more options 
provide more autonomy, since the individual given the options may 
effectively have no way to analyze them or determine which is 
preferable. To provide the greatest possibility of autonomy, we would 
need to provide a rich array of options as well as work to ensure that 
the chooser has the capacity to rate and compare those options.373 
Professor Eggert confronted the difficulty in determining 
whether to honor an individual’s past wish to bind themselves in 
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the present.374 He reasoned, “[t]o determine which version of the 
self-limiter’s choice—the earlier decision to limit autonomy or the 
later decision to revoke that limitation—is closer to being more 
authentic and voluntary, the relative quality of the choice should 
be examined.”375 He listed such factors as whether a “decision 
was made with greater competency, more information, and 
greater freedom from manipulation, coercion, or fraud, as well as 
which shows a more ‘resolute intention’ to make the decision.”376 
In considering the philosophical idea of “separat[ing] one’s 
identity into various strands, such as a present self and various 
future selves,”377 Professor Eggert theorized that, “[i]f we . . . split 
the self this way, then the self-limitation of autonomy becomes, 
to a significant extent, a method for the present self to bind the 
future self, or for the long-term planning self to bind the self 
desiring immediate gratification.”378 
Reviewing the efficacy of self-exclusion programs in the realm 
of problem gambling, Professor Eggert observed that self-exclusion 
is a “method of providing protection from excessive gambling, while 
respecting the autonomy of the problem gambler.”379 He explained 
that self-exclusion programs involve self-identified problem 
gamblers voluntarily signing up to “request to be personally 
excluded from one or more, or perhaps all, of the casinos in the 
state.”380 “The self-exclusion program,” Professor Eggert wrote, “is a 
classic example of the self-limitation of autonomy as a method of 
consumer protection. Like Ulysses, the compulsive gambler 
recognizes that he will be unable to resist the siren call of the 
casinos, and seeks a way to limit his own freedom.”381 He noted that 
self-exclusion programs “also appeared useful as a ‘gateway’ to lead 
problem gamblers to obtain professional counseling for about half of 
those who self-excluded.”382 
In evaluating the weaknesses of such programs, Professor 
Eggert conceded, “[t]he greatest potential flaw of these self-exclusion 
programs appears to be their unreliability, the ease with which 
gamblers can circumvent them, either by going to a different casino 
in a state which does not have a central registry, or by tricking the 
casinos to allow them to gamble.”383 Nonetheless, Professor Eggert 
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went on to conclude, in analyzing self-exclusion programs as a form 
of self-limitation: 
A gambler’s choice to self-exclude will, in general, likely increase 
rather than decrease his overall autonomy, at least if it aids the 
gambler to defeat his addiction. The amount of autonomy the gambler 
gives up will likely be small so long as he honors the self-exclusion, 
since he is still free in every other aspect of his life. The risk that he 
may have erred in his thinking also seems small, since existing 
evidence indicates that almost all those who self-exclude are problem 
gamblers. Perhaps most importantly, a gambler is likely to be acting 
more freely and more true to his essential self when he initially 
decides to limit his autonomy, rather than later, when his compulsion 
to gamble would push him to reenter a casino.384 
As an example, Professor Eggert detailed the Illinois Gaming 
Board’s step-by-step requirements for opting into the  
self-exclusion program, and noted that “[m]ost likely, people 
would put much more consideration and thought into going to a 
gaming board office and self-excluding than they would to 
dropping quarters into a slot machine.”385 
Just as limit-setting has encouraged individual autonomy in 
the gambling context, it could be similarly effective at combatting 
problematic loot box purchase activity. Individuals playing a 
certain game on their personal account would not be able to 
circumvent the lock without opening a brand new account, 
defeating the purpose of accruing rewards on their original 
account.386 Professor Eggert’s concerns about traditional  
self-exclusion workarounds are not entirely assuaged in video 
game circles, however, because those players could go on to simply 
play a different game or continue to obsessively play the game to 
make up the difference.387 However, a player who encounters a 
message from their past selves, displayed in game and advising 
them that they have hit their pre-determined limit, will have more 
of an opportunity to reflect upon their actions than a player who 
does not see such a message. 
While the casinos that opted out of the self-exclusion 
program (i.e. the casinos that did not have a central registry of 
participants) provided a venue for would-be self-excluders to 
cheat their past selves and exceed their personal limits, a 
government-mandated form of limit-setting would by definition 
not allow disinterested vendors to “opt out.”388 Unlike 
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commentators at the FTC workshop, who struggled to envision a 
limit-setting scenario that could survive the perverse incentive 
individual developers would have to fail to adhere to the Industry 
standard,389 a government-mandated limit-setting program 
would leave no room for lawful noncompliance. The Industry 
would be required to adhere to limit-setting practices in all of its 
loot box titles, deprived only of its opportunity to exploit 
vulnerable individuals. 
Professor Eggert, writing about self-exclusion practices, 
considered the words of philosopher Joseph Raz: “[O]ne cannot 
force another person to be more autonomous. Instead, the most 
that can be done is ‘by and large confined to securing the 
background conditions which enable a person to be 
autonomous.’”390 By requiring video game developers to 
implement limit-setting mechanisms in their loot box purchase 
systems, we as a society would be providing compulsive 
individuals with a better opportunity to exercise their autonomy 
than currently available under the ESRB’s direction. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Loot boxes are linked to problem gambling.391 Whether they 
cause problem gambling or merely exploit players’ existing 
tendencies,392 we as a society should not tolerate the Industry’s 
attempts to monetize the practice under its sole discretion. The 
ESRB has abdicated its authority by failing to advance meaningful 
regulations in a timely manner, and Industry advocates frequently 
engage in bad-faith argumentation to justify the practice and 
disregard or deny the harm to vulnerable individuals. The 
psychological and financial harm inflicted by loot boxes is real and 
pervasive, and individuals and their representatives are beginning to 
wake up to that fact. Both the federal and state governments have 
the ability to take action, and have merely neglected to do so thus far. 
Rather than wait for the ESRB to cede regulatory ground inch-by-
inch, consumers should demand regulatory protection by an entity 
that primarily serves their own interests, not those of the Industry. 
The state governments are perhaps best equipped and empowered to 
act on behalf of consumers in this area. Limit-setting mechanisms 
and meaningful odds disclosures could serve as powerful tools to help 
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consumers make informed purchase decisions, cutting through the 
veils raised by in-game currencies and piecemeal transactions. 
Ultimately, video games are here to stay. They are a beloved 
pastime for millions of Americans.393 Video game developers perform 
a useful role in creating these games for the enjoyment of the public, 
and loot boxes help to support some of them. This Article’s goal is not 
to chastise developers, nor to advocate for the outright ban of loot 
boxes. Rather, this Article has attempted to peel back layers of 
Industry double-talk in order to reveal the very real costs of loot 
boxes and their similarities to traditional gambling practices, so that 
readers can decide for themselves how best to proceed. At the very 
least, perhaps a reader will think twice before hitting “Buy Now” 
when purchasing a loot box in their favorite game. 
The true cost could be far more than $1.99. 
 
 393 Myself included. 
